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Articles
The Light Between Twilight and Dusk:




With the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984
("Act"),1 years of congressional efforts at redefining the federal insanity
defense2 finally reached fruition. For the first time in history, Congress
successfully passed comprehensive legislation pertaining to the defense of
criminal responsibility, an area which was previously part of the small
but exclusive domain of the federal judiciary. 3
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University LL.M Program in Litigation;
Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A. 1975, Princeton
University; J.D. 1979, Northeastern University School of Law.
While the ideas expressed in this Article are solely the author's, the author wishes to
thank Professors Richard Bonnie, Roy Sobelson, and David Wexler for their insightful com-
ments on earlier drafts. The author also wishes to thank Lonnie Valentine and Cady Gabriel
for their continued support.
1. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, tit. II, ch. IV, §§ 401-406 (1984) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 20 (Supp. 1985), recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 17 by Pub. L. No. 99-646, 100 Stat. 3599
(1986)).
2. See, e.g., S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 6915 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 22,337 (1980); S. 1722, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 23,537 (1979); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 1305
(1977); S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. Rnc. 28,420 (1975); S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 9634 (1973); S. 1, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 119 CONG. Rnc. 92 (1973)
compiled in Smith, Limiting the Insanity Defense: A Rational Approach to Irrational Crimes,
47 Mo. L. Rv. 605, 607 n.2 (1982).
3. There is, of course, no federal common law of crimes. United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 415
(1816); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (federal crimes are solely
creatures of statute). The federal courts, however, have traditionally relied upon judge-made
law for the evolving articulation of common law defenses, including the insanity defense. It is
debatable whether Congress or any legislative body has any special competence to define the
proper scope of the defense of nonresponsibility. Rather than allowing Congress to articulate a
standard based on abstractions, the better medium for formulating the proper test of personal
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Prior to the Act's passage, the federal trial and appellate courts had
relied upon one of two distinct substantive tests of insanity. Both of
these tests provided offenders who suffered from either cognitive or voli-
tional impairments with grounds for complete exculpation. The first test,
in place from the late nineteenth century4 until the middle of the twenti-
eth century, was a combination of the M'Naghten 5 test and the control
test known as the "irresistible impulse" test. The second test, used from
the middle of the twentieth century until its abolition by Congress in
1984, was the American Law Institute's ("ALI") formulation, which was
promulgated as part of the Institute's Model Penal Code. 6
The M'Naghten test excuses those offenders whose mental disease
leaves them wholly devoid of the ability to know right from wrong. 7 By
its own terms, M'Naghten provides a defense only for an offender who is
cognitively impaired. Cognitive impairment is understood as a disorder
that undermines a person's ability to perceive reality accurately.8 The
irresistible impulse test excuses offenders who suffer from defects of con-
trol, that is to say, persons whose mental disease results in volitional im-
pairment.9 The volitionally impaired offender knows the difference
accountability may be the individual case and the irreplaceable knowledge and contextual un-
derstanding gained by the judiciary in reviewing the trial records that pose the controversies in
real life rather than hypothetical postures. Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to "Abolish" the
Insanity Defense in S.1: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 711 (1976).
4. The Supreme Court first approved a federal insanity test in Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469 (1895).
5. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985). The ALI formulation was promulgated in
draft form in 1955 and formally adopted by the Institute in 1962. By its terms, "[a] person is
not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Id. (emphasis added).
The highlighted portion of the ALI test provides for exculpation based on volitional im-
pairment and has been commonly referred to as the test's "volitional prong." Like the irresis-
tible impulse formulation, this portion of the ALI standard is also denominated a "control
test" because it provides for exculpation for those suffering from defects of control. The federal
circuit courts of appeal commenced consideration and adoption of the ALI test immediately
following promulgation. The cases in which the federal appeals courts adopted the ALI test
are collected infra at note 153.
7. MNaghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. Pursuant to the
M'Naghten test, there is grounds for an insanity defense if, and only if "the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong." Id.
8. J. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 25.03, at 295 n.2 (1987).
9. The irresistible impulse test was first articulated in the medical literature as providing
for the exoneration of persons who were "irresistibly impelled to the commission of criminal
acts." I. RAY, THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 263 (1838); see also F. WINS-
LOW, THE PLEA OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL CASES 74 (1843) (referencing persons "driven by
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between right and wrong, but suffers from mental disease which com-
promises his capacity for self-control. 10 The irresistible impulse test was
added to the substantive test of insanity in recognition of a longstanding
assumption that there are mental diseases which impair volition or self-
control but do not impair the capacity to know right from wrong, and
that persons suffering from such diseases deserve exculpation. By utiliz-
ing a hybrid of the M'Naghten test and the irresistible impulse formula,
the federal judiciary ensured that mentally ill offenders had a legal basis
for a plea of insanity, regardless of whether their mental illness caused
them to suffer from defects of control or defects of reason.
The ALI formulation also excuses both cognitively and volitionally
impaired offenders. Under the ALI test, an offender whose mental dis-
ease or defect caused him to lack the substantial capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law would be excused.I It thus defined the insanity defense
in terms at least as broad as a test that integrated the M'Naghten and the
irresistible impulse standards.
Pursuant to the Insanity Defense Reform Act, wide-sweeping
changes were wrought in the scope of the federal insanity defense. Re-
garding the substantive test of insanity, the Act dictates that "at the time
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts." 12 The new standard
eliminates all provision for excusing volitionally compromised offenders
and recognizes a defense only for those mentally ill persons who are se-
verely cognitively impaired. The sole relevant criterion in administering
the federal insanity defense is whether a defendant can appreciate the
nature and quality, or the wrongfulness, of his actions. This standard
essentially resurrects the narrow confines of M'Naghten's right-wrong
formulation. 13
an irresistible impulse"). Broadly stated, the test was first applied in the United States in State
v. Thompson, Wright's Ohio Rep. 617 (1834), and in England in Ferrer's Case, 19 How. State
Tr. 886 (Eng. 1760), both of which predate the articulation of the M'Naghten test.
10. J. DRESSLER, supra note 8.
11. See supra text accompanying note 6.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1986).
13. The Act's substantive test of insanity is identical to M'Naghten in that there is no
provision for volitional exculpation, the degree of impairment must be absolute (as versus
substantial under ALI), qualifying mental disorders must be severe, and the sole focus is on
defects of reason. The only respect in which the Act's standard arguably differs from
M'Naghten is in its perpetuation of the term "appreciate" from the ALI formulation in place
of the M'Naghten term "know." While the ALI test's authors used appreciation to explicitly
embody a broad definition of knowledge which included an emotional or affective understand-
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Thus, the Act has radically altered the calculus by which a federal
jury is authorized to determine whether a defendant's actions are so far
removed from normal behavior that basic jurisprudential rules of per-
sonal culpability no longer apply. By excising all provision for the excul-
pation of those offenders who suffer from volitional impairment, the Act
has drastically narrowed the substantive test of insanity applicable in the
federal courts. Consequently, the universe of mentally ill persons who
are authorized to plead not guilty by reason of insanity in a federal crimi-
nal trial has been markedly restricted.
The thesis of this Article is that the Act's abolition of a federal in-
sanity defense based on volitional incapacitation is the product of reflex-
ive, rather than reasoned legislative action. In section I, the Article
begins by examining the climate of legislation in which the Insanity De-
fense Reform Act was passed. Section II then argues that the Act's abo-
lition of a federal volitional impairment defense is contrary to historical
understandings of the importance of free will to criminality. Section III
shows how the Act runs afoul of constitutional entitlements embodied in
the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments and the
fifth amendment's notion of substantive due process. Finally, section IV
demonstrates why elimination of a volitional insanity test is impeachable
from a policy perspective. The Article concludes by urging a return of
the control test to federal criminal law.
I. The Climate of Legislation
A. History Repeats Itself
The impetus for the Act's passage was undoubtedly the acquittal of
John Hinckley, Jr.,14 and the overwhelming public outrage at the excul-
ing of what was known, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 commentary vol. 2, at 169 (1985), it
is not at all clear that the term was interpreted so broadly by the federal trial courts charged
with applying the ALI formula. See, e.g., P. Low, J. JEFFRIES, JR. & R. BONNIE, THE TRIAL
OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE 50-51 (1986)
(wherein the government presses a narrow construction of the term, the defense urges that the
term be construed as was intended by the ALI, and the trial court declines to clarify what
definition of the term is to govern jury deliberations). In the HANDBOOK ON THE COMPRE-
HENSIVE CRIME CONTROL AcT OF 1984 AND OTHER CRIMINAL STATUTES ENACTED BY
THE 98TH CONGRESS (1984), federal prosecutors are directed to "argue that 'emotional' or
'subjective' appreciation is not covered by the new standard, and that the only purpose of the
new test is to determine whether the defendant had the cognition or reasoning ability to under-
stand his acts." Id. at 59. The Handbook further notes that this position is justified because
the" 'appreciation' prong of the A.L.I. test was similarly limited, as was the rule established in
M'Naghten's Case. " Id. at 60.
14. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), opinion clarified and
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pation of the President's would-be assassin.15 Hinckley's successful in-
sanity plea had a profound catalytic effect on previously inchoate
revisionist and abolitionist legislative agendas pertaining to the insanity
defense. Within months of the verdict, stalled hearings and dissipated
lobbying efforts had coalesced into a unified drive to "do something"
about the insanity defense.16 Various professional groups rapidly joined
the hue and cry. The American Medical Association favored outright
abolition, 17 while both the American Psychiatric Association (APA)' 8
reconsid. denied, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(for the pretrial rulings); Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. 1981) (for the trial record).
15. See Limiting the Insanity Defense. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) (hearings immediately
convened as a result of widespread public dismay over Hinckley's acquittal); The Insanity
Defense: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982)
(Hinckley case precipitates fervent congressional debate of the continuing viability of a federal
insanity defense); Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-93 (1983)
(compilation of newspaper, radio, and television coverage of the public outcry in the aftermath
of the Hinckley acquittal).
16. See Arenella, Reflections on the Current Proposals to Abolish or Reform the Insanity
Defense, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 272 (1982) (Hinckley verdict unites previously dissipated
efforts at insanity defense reform); Widespread Public Outrage: Hinckley Verdict Prompts Bills
to Overhaul Insanity Defense, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1505 (1982); Hinckley Acquittal
Brings Moves to Change Insanity Defense, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1982, at D21, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1982, at B6, col. 1. Hinckley's assassination attempt occurred on March 30,
1981 and his acquittal on June 21, 1982. Witness the timing of even a small sampling of the
bills to address the federal insanity defense: Senate Bill 818, by Senator Hatch, March 26,
1981 (to abolish the defense except as it bears upon mens tea); Senate Bill 1106, by Senators
Zorinsky and Thurmond, April 27, 1981 (providing for a federal verdict of guilty but mentally
ill); Senate Bill 2658, by Senators Specter and Rudman, June 22, 1982 (allowing affirmative
defense based on defects of control so long as defendant meets the burden of proof with clear
and convincing evidence and without expert testimony); Senate Bill 2669, by Senator Pressler,
June 23, 1982 (abolishing the defense except when it negates state of mind and providing for
mandatory confinement following acquittal); Senate Bill 2672 by Senator Quayle, June 23,
1982 (same); Senate Bill 2678 by Senators Nunn, Chiles, and Randolph, June 24, 1982 (abol-
ishing volitional prong, placing the burden of proof on the defense and providing for a post-
acquittal commitment hearing) compiled in Bills to Amend Title 18 to Limit the Insanity De-
fense: Hearings on S.818, S.1106, S.1558, S.2669, S.2672, S.2678, S.2745 and S.2780 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-38 (1982) (statement of Frank
Maloney, Attorney, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
17. AMA Calls for Abolition of Insanity Defense, 7 MENTAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 136
(1983). The AMA's position is informed by the abolitionist writings of renowned criminal
scholar Norval Morris. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 53-76
(1982).
18. American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. I. PsY-
CHrIATRY 681 (1983) [hereinafter APA Statement]. The APA did not formally recommend a
test, but favored a standard that would provide for exculpation of a defendant when "as a
result of mental disease or mental retardation he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct at the time of the offense." Ma at 685.
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and the American Bar Association1 9 supported retention of solely a cog-
nitive-based insanity defense.
The widespread official and public consternation was hardly unprec-
edented. Almost a century and a half ago, the public was equally
alarmed by the insanity acquittal of another would-be assassin of a high-
ranking governmental official. A popular rhyme of that time embodied
the adverse public sentiment:
CONGRATULATIONS ON A LATE ACQUITTAL
Ye People of England: exult and be glad,
For ye're now at the will of the merciless mad.
Why say ye that but three authorities reign-
Crown, Commons, and Lords!-You omit the insane!
They're a privileg'd class, whom no statute controls,
And their murderous charter exists in their souls.
Do they wish to spill blood-they have only to play
A few pranks-get asylum'd a month and a day-
Then heigh! to escape from the mad-doctor's keys,
And to pistol or stab whomsoever they please.
No the dog has a human-like wit-in creation
He resembles most nearly our own generation:
Then if madmen for murder escape with impunity,
Why deny a poor dog the same noble immunity?
So if dog or man bit you, beware being nettled,
For crime is no crime-when the mind is unsettled.20
The occasion for the verse was the 1843 acquittal, by reason of in-
sanity, of Daniel M'Naghten, who had attempted to kill England's Prime
Minister.21 M'Naghten's case offers striking parallels to that of John
Hinckley. There was ample evidence that both men clearly suffered from
delusions which severely impaired their abilities to reason cogently:
M'Naghten's delusion centered on unfounded fears that he was being
persecuted by Queen Victoria's government and the ruling Tory party.22
19. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 260 (First Tent. Draft 1983)
[hereinafter MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS]. The ABA House of Delegates adopted these
standards in 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 7 (2d ed. 1986 Supp.) on August 7,
1984. The ABA's proposal limits the availability of the so-called defense of "nonresponsibil-
ity" to those who suffer from cognitive impairment at the time of the offense by providing for
the defendant's exculpation when "as a result of mental disease or defect, that person was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of such conduct." MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS,
supra at 323.
20. Campbell, London Standard, Mar. 7, 1843, at 1, col. 1, quoted in R. MORAN, KNOW-
ING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN 19-20
(1981).
21. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). For a fascinating and
exhaustive history of the defendant, his case, and his life-long institutionalization at London's
hospital for the criminally insane, see R. MORAN, supra note 20.
22. In his opening statement, M'Naghten's counsel read from his client's statement at
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Hinckley's delusion involved a perceived relationship between assassinat-
ing President Reagan and earming the love of an unattainable movie
star.2 3 Both trials included protracted and hotly contested analyses of
the defendants' mental conditions at the time of the assassination at-
tempts.24 Both men evidenced such serious mental disease that their re-
spective juries had strong reason to acquit. Yet both juries faced
overwhelming chastisement when they voted to do So. 2 5 More critically,
in the aftermath of both cases, the substantive test of insanity was recast
in terms that either were interpreted as26 or explicitly accomplished 27 the
arraignment which reflected M'Naghten's belief that the Tories had compelled him to attempt
to kill the Prime Minister by their relentless pursuit of him to France, Scotland, and England,
had reduced him to a life of sleeplessness and consumption, and had deprived him of all peace
of mind. R. MORAN, supra note 20, at 98. Legal scholars have typically portrayed M'Naghten
as seriously cognitively impaired. See, eg., H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL
INSANITY 200 (1972) (M'Naghten was "incapable of forming a rational moral judgment"); J.
BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 95-96 (1955)
(M'Naghten regarded as "subject to delusions of persecution as well as hallucinations and his
conduct in London... was mad indeed.").
23. According to a defense psychiatrist, Hinckley believed that by assassinating Reagan,
he would sacrifice his own life or freedom in a historic deed that would gain him the respect
and love of movie star Jodie Foster. Defense experts were of the opinion that such a belief was
clearly delusional. See P. Low, J. JEFFRIES, JR. & R. BONNIE, supra note 13, at 30-34 (1986).
24. With regard to the Hinckley case, compare id. at 30-37, 49-61 and 64-80 with id. at
37-49, 61-64 and 80-83 in which the diametrically opposed viewpoints of the defendant's and
the prosecution's expert witnesses are abridged and quoted. As to the M'Naghten case, see R.
MORAN, supra note 20, at 77-108, in which the evidence for the prosecution and the defense is
summarized and portions of the trial record are reported.
25. See, e.g., L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCK-
LEY, JR. 116 (1984) (summarizing the results of a public poll taken the day after the verdict,
which showed that 83% of the nation "thought that justice was not done in the Hinckley
trial."). In the M'Naghten case, the presiding judge's final charge noted that "the whole of the
medical evidence [was] on one side" and that "if you find the prisoner not guilty... on the
ground of isanity... proper care will be taken of him." R. MORAN, supra note 20, at 108.
The effect of the trial court's instruction was to virtually direct a verdict in M'Naghten's favor.
Id. Nevertheless, public dissatisfaction with the acquittal was legion. See R. MORAN, supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
26. When M'Naghten was acquitted by reason of insanity, the public outcry and official
consternation were such that the House of Lords directed the justices of the Queen's Bench to
respond to a set of questions pertaining to the proper ambit of the insanity defense. Thus, the
case as reported represents not the typical appellate opinion, but rather an advisory opinion,
issued in a climate of widespread outrage at the exoneration of the would-be assassin.
M'Naghten's Case has been viewed by most as having redefined the insanity defense in purely
cognitive terms, although a strong argument exists that the case only-defined insanity in cogni-
tive terms because the court was directed only to state the rule pertaining to mental impair-
ment of the capacity to reason. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. Significantly,
Justice Maule wrote separately stating his objection to the issuance of the opinion based wholly
on abstractions and his fear "that as these questions relate to matters of criminal law of great
importance... the answers to them by the Judges may embarrass the administration of justice,
when they are cited in criminal trials." 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 204, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 720 (1843).
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abolition of any provision for exculpating the volitionally impaired. So it
is that history repeats itself, regardless of the plethora of psychiatric ad-
vances that have been realized in the century and a half since
M'Naghten's promulgation.
While it may have been defensible for the law to surrender to public
antipathy in Victorian England, a like result should not be sanctioned
today. Modem-day legislators operate in an advanced, information-rich
society, in which expert opinion and hard data exist to provide a solid
foundation for the rule of law. Ideally, this framework should hold the
law inviolate against the vagrant tides of public opinion, challenging the
law to "serve not only what we conceive from time to time to be our
immediate material needs but also certain enduring values."'2 8 Justice
demands no less, for those whom society would banish to prison "often
speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society's demand for punish-
ment; [yet i]t is the particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the
Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate
the conditions of social life."2 9 The strides in psychiatric understanding
which have been realized in the century-and-a-half since M'Naghten's
articulation seriously impugn the integrity of Congress' resurrection of a
rigid cognitive test.3 0 Consequently, the Act is ripe for challenge.
B. The Insanity Defense Was Not Over Used
This legislation was also enacted in response to the perception that
the defense was abused through excessive use. Advocates of the Act
claimed it would redress "a glaring deficiency in our federal criminal jus-
tice system-the abuse of the insanity defense, ...a long-developing
problem that we have permitted to confuse and misguide [the] fact-find-
ing process of criminal trials."' 3' Empirical studies of the insanity de-
fense, however, radically impeach the notion that this defense was
The judges' responses to the questions posed for their consideration were appended to the
official report of the original case and have come to be known as the "M'Naghten test."
27. The legislative history of the Act makes it clear that Congress no longer sanctioned
an insanity defense based on volitional defects. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 225-
29, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3407-11. This report has
been consistently cited as the legislative history of the Act. See, e.g., United States v. Hills-
berg, 812 F.2d 328, 332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1981 (1987); United States v. Free-
man, 804 F.2d 1574, 1575 (11th Cir. 1986).
28. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962).
29. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1793-94 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987).
30. See infra notes 153-62, 257-62 and accompanying text.
31. 129 CONG. REC. H381 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1983) (statement of Rep. Gekas), quoted in
United States v. Kowal, 596 F. Supp. 375, 376 (D. Conn. 1984).
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seriously abused. In 1973, the federal insanity defense was described as
resulting in fewer than 100 acquittals per year out of more than 50,000
federal criminal cases brought annually. 32 Following the Hinckley ver-
dict, the United States Department of Justice released the results of a
nationwide survey of the federal prosecutors' offices which revealed that,
in 1981, only four federal defendants successfully pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity. 33
The federal experience is in no sense extraordinary. A National
Mental Health Association (NMHA) commission, appointed to study
the insanity defense in 1983, found that public sentiment against the de-
fense was based on myths, rather than reality. Such myths were gener-
ated by the disproportionate and sensationalistic press coverage afforded
the anomalous case of the violent insanity acquittee.34 Contrary to pub-
lic opinion, the NMHA study established that the insanity defense is in-
frequently raised and even less frequently successful. 35 Furthermore, the
majority of those who plead insanity are nonviolent, rather than homici-
dal offenders. 36 Indeed, most insanity pleas are quietly agreed to by the
prosecution, the defense, their respective psychiatric experts, and the
judge, thereby obviating all need and opportunity for public or adver-
sarial scrutiny of the issue. 37
Although the insanity defense has not been statistically analyzed in
each of the federal circuits and the fifty states, the NMHA findings have
been extensively corroborated. For example, in a three year study of Or-
egon criminal cases in which the accused had successfully pleaded the
insanity defense, prosecutors agreed to the acquittal in eighty-six percent
of the cases. Only four percent of the defendants ever presented their
cases before a jury.38 In fiscal 1982, 52 of 32,500 defendants represented
by the New Jersey public defender pleaded not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Only fifteen of those raising the defense were successful. 39 In
32. Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The Most Significant Feature of the Ad-
ministration's Proposed Criminal Code-An Essay, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 434, 436 (1973).
33. L. CAPLAN, supra note 25, at 104.
34. NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 5 (1983). The National Commission
was established by the NMHA to "broaden the public debate on the insanity defense and to
make recommendations on how the insanity defense should be changed, if change is war-
ranted." Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 14-15.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 23-24.
38. Rogers, Bloom & Manson, Insanity Defenses: Contested or Conceded? 141 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 885, 886 (1984).
39. H.R. REP. No. 577, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 nn.7-8 (1983).
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Virginia, a 1983 report indicated that nonresponsibility was alleged in
less than one percent of all felony cases and no more than fifteen defend-
ants were acquitted by reason of insanity each year.40 In New York, the
defense is raised in less than two percent of all felony cases and has a
seventy-five percent failure rate.41
In a 1979 study of Wyoming, a state which had enacted the expan-
sive ALI formulation in 1973, researchers found that while the public
believed that thirty-seven percent of arrestees pled insanity, only 102 out
of 26,567 defendants, or 0.46%, actually did so.42 A 1980 study of Cali-
fornia's experience with the ALI formulation reported only 259 insanity
acquittals, a mere 0.6% of all felony arrests during that year.43 Addi-
tionally, studies from several ALI jurisdictions have shown that the "typ-
ical" insanity acquittee was not the wrongful beneficiary of a circus-like
battle of the experts, but rather 4n offender who was diagnosed by both
prosecution and defense psychiatric experts as suffering from the same
cognitively or volitionally-based major mental illness.44
In short, the insanity defense is infrequently raised and even less
frequently successful. Administration of the defense is largely by consen-
sus, a consensus which evidences not only the unity of the prosecution
and the defense in individual cases, but also the core compatibility of the
precepts of forensic psychiatry and foundational tenets of the criminal
law.
Against this empirical background, the post-Hinckley Congressional
strafing of the cuckoo's nest is especially troublesome. Legislation is "en-
acted.., from an experience of evils."'45 Care must be taken, however, to
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Pasewark & Seidenzahl, Opinions Concerning the Insanity Plea and Criminality
Among Mental Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 199, 200-01 (1979).
43. Turner & Ornstein, Distinguishing the Wicked from the Mentally Ii, 3 CAL. LAW. 40,
42 (1983).
44. See Rogers, Bloom & Manson, supra note 38, at 887; Petrila, The Insanity Defense
and Other Mental Health Dispositions in Missouri, 5 INT. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 81 (1982) (docu-
menting a low frequency of trials for persons adjudicated insane in another ALI jurisdiction);
Singer, Insanity Acquittal in the Seventies: Observations and Empirical Analysis of One Juris-
diction, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 406, 407 (1978) (finding that New Jersey insanity
trials were abbreviated nonjury proceedings in which the experts agreed upon the diagnosis;
New Jersey defined insanity as per the M'Naghten test); Fukanaga, Pasewark, Hawkins &
Gudeman, Insanity Plea: Interexaminer Agreement and Concordance of Psychiatric Opinion
and Court Verdict, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325 (1981) (reporting a high incidence of interex-
aminer agreement on insanity and strong congruence between expert opinions and court ver-
dicts in Hawaii, an ALI jurisdiction).
45. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). The entire quote is instructive:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experi-
ence of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to
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ensure that the law accurately distinguishes good from evil and Congress
must faithfully legislate in light of the difference.46 When deprivation of
liberty and the stigma of criminalization are at stake, abdication of this
legislative responsibility raises concerns of a constitutional dimension,
concerns that must be meaningfully addressed in articulating the proper
relationship between volitional insanity and the criminal law.
H. The Control Test in History
A. Early Commentators
To justify abolishing the volitional test of nonresponsibility, Con-
gress cited contemporary psychiatrists' professed inability to distinguish
scientifically those who are unable to resist criminal impulses from those
who simply choose not to resist.47 Thus, the demise of a federal control
test was seen as a necessary by-product of modern limitations in psychi-
atric discernment. 4 The modern difficulties of psychiatric line drawing,
however, are certainly no more acute than they have been historically.
-the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a princIiple to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.... In the application of a
constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be.
Id.
46. In fairness, it first should be noted that Hinckley, rather than desiring to "beat the
rap" by feigning mental illness, actually wished to plea bargain in exchange for his guilty plea,
but the prosecution refused. Second, by pursuing the case federally rather than in the District
of Columbia, the prosecution assumed the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. This failure to take advantage of the District of Columbia's allocation of the burden of
proving insanity on the defense was an undoubtedly fatal decision in view of the clear contro-
versy regarding Hinckley's mental condition. Third, although the prosecution had retained
three distinguished experts to testify to Hinckley's sanity, the government rested its case after
calling only one expert, apparently overly-confident that the case had been won. Given these
facts, Congress and an informed public were hard-pressed to conclude that Hinckley's acquit-
tal was evidence of the evils of an insanity defense which provided exculpation based on defects
of control. See A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALITY 82-83 (1984).
47. Although Congress acknowledged the moral basis of volitional incajpacitation, it re-
jected a volitional prong because of a perceived difficulty in reliably establishing whether a
particular defendant was unable, or simply unwilling, to exercise self-control. S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 225-29, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182,
3407-11.
48. The legislative history of the Act quotes Richard J. Bonnie, Professor of Law and
Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia:
"There is, in short, no objective basis for distinguishing between offenders who were undeter-
rable and those who were merely undeterred, between the impulse that was irresistible and the
impulse not resisted .... " S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 222, 226-27, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3408-09; accord, APA Statement, supra note 18, at
685.
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Yet, the concept of volitional exoneration has long been recognized by
courts and legal scholars. Indeed, even in the Dark Ages of psychiatry,
the law recognized the exculpatory impact of defects of control.49
Aristotle was the first to articulate the essential relationship between
voluntariness and blameworthiness. 50  In words that could have been
part of the post-Hinckley congressional debate, Aristotle wrote:
[S]ince virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary
passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are
involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the volun-
tary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are
studying the nature of virtue and useful also for legislators with a view
to the assigning both of honours and of punishments. 51
According to Aristotle's analysis, actions are involuntary for one of two
reasons. Actions "owing to ignorance" and actions committed while
"under compulsion" are both involuntary. 52 Thus, Aristotle contem-
plated exoneration for both cognitive and volitional types of
impairments. 53
Aristotle's dual vision of the nature of involuntary action was
adopted by early English writers and courts.54 Commentators, such as
49. See Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense
and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1380 (1986) ("[A]nalysis of the early
history of the insanity defense shows that for six centuries before M'Naghten's Case, commen-
tators, judges, and attorneys identified a number of specific capacities as relevant to the excul-
patory character of the insanity defense. These capacities can be placed into two basic groups,
cognition and volition .... ). The article catalogues the ancient pedigree of both cognitive
and volitional bases for exculpation from Aristotle through modem times. Id. at 1372-89. It
could, of course, be argued that the early commentators understood volition in the narrowest
sense, that being a simple reference to the concept of free will as it bears upon the presence or
absence of mens rea. There is, however, nothing in the historical record to support such a
narrow construction. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, the most logical conclusion is that
volition was viewed as embodying both free will and the inability to exercise free will due to
mental infirmity.
50. D. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 18-20 (1983).
51. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA 1109b, Book III (W. Ross trans. 1925).
52. Id. at 1109b-lll0a.
53. Id. at 11 13b. ("[Legislators] punish and take vengeance on those who do wicked acts
(unless they have acted under compulsion or as a result of ignorance for which they are not
themselves responsible)."). See also id. at 1135b, Book V8 ("[T]hat which is done in igno-
rance, or though not done in ignorance is not in the agent's power, or is done under compul-
sion, is involuntary.").
54. The historical evolution of the insanity defense in England has been well documented.
See, e.g., J. BIGGS, supra note 22, at 81-88 (1955); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMI-
NAL LAW 475-77 (2d ed. 1960); D. HERMANN, supra note 50, at 21-31; R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 950-51 (3d ed. 1982); 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENG-
LAND 15-73 (1968); H. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 17-21
(1933); Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English Criminal Law, 12
CALIF. L. REV. 105, 110-121 (1924); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1004-7 (1932).
[Vol. 40
Bracton, Lambard, and Dalton, have identified both cognition and voli-
tion as critical elements of responsibility. Writing in the early thirteenth
century, Bracton, the first medieval jurist to address the topic of insanity
and crime, observed that "will and purpose are the distinctive marks of
crimes." 5 Two centuries later, in a handbook for justices of the peace,
William Lambard of Lincoln's Inn echoed the exculpatory significance of
a defective will saying, "there is no person to be punished, to whom the
law hath denied a will, or mind to do the harm: as a mad man .... ,,56
In the seventeenth century, Dalton similarly pointed to both cogni-
tion and volition as conditions precedent to a finding of criminal respon-
sibility, observing that "[i]f one that is non compos mentis, or an ideot,
kill a man, this is no felony; for they have no knowledge of good and evil,
nor can have a felonious intent, nor a will or mind to do harm .... -57
Some British commentators, such as Hale, Hawkins, and Black-
stone, viewed volitional capacity as the linchpin of criminal responsibil-
ity, relegating cognitive impairment to a secondary correlative status.
Cognitive impairment was significant only to the extent that cognition
bears upon the capacity to freely exercise one's will. Hale's description
of the primacy of volition and the subsidiary nature of cognitive defi-
ciency is typical:
Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties, understand-
ing and liberty of will, ... the liberty or choice of the will presupposeth
an act of the understanding to know the thing or action chosen by the
will, it [therefore] follows that, where there is a total defect of the un-
derstanding, there is no free act of the will . .58
Hawkins recognized the injustice of criminalizing the actions of
both cognitively and volitionally compromised offenders when he wrote,
"[t]he Guilt of offending against any law whatsoever, necessarily suppos-
ing a wilful Disobedience, can never justly be imputed to those who are
either uncapable of understanding it, or of conforming themselves to
it.' ' 59 To Hawkins, both classes of offenders deserved legal exoneration.
Blackstone's Commentaries, which played such a paramount role in
the articulation of early American jurisprudence, shared Hawkins' and
55. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CusToMs OF ENGLAND 375 (S. Thome trans.
1968).
56. W. LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA 228 (London 1599). In an earlier edition of his treatise,
Lambard observed that "[i]f a mad man or a naturall foole, or a lunatike in the time of his
lunaie... do kill a m[an], this is no felonious [act] ... for they [cannot] be said to have any
understanding will." W. LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA CAP. 21.218 (1581) (quoted in United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 764 (3d Cir. 1961)).
57. M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 223 (1622).
58. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14-15 (1778).
59. 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1 (1716).
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Hales' perceptions regarding the relevance of both cognition and volition
to questions of responsibility. Blackstone characterized the volitional
question as the ultimate issue, stating that "[a]ll the several pleas and
excuses, which protect the committer of a forbidden act from the punish-
ment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced to this single
consideration, the want or defect of will. 60 With specific regard to in-
sanity, Blackstone explained that defects in cognition deprived the of-
fender of his free will and thus operated to preclude criminal liability.61
B. Early English Case Law
An examination of early English case law indicates that the judici-
ary and the trial bar similarly identified the capacities for cognition and
volition as the twin bases for excusable insanity. The concept of voli-
tional defects was introduced to English jurisprudence in 1760, when, in
Ferrer's Case 62 the House of Lords convicted one of its members of mur-
der. In support of his insanity defense, Lord Ferrer argued:
If [the witnesses] have not directly proved me so insane as not to know
the difference between a moral and an immoral action, they have at
least proved that I was liable to be driven and hurried into that un-
happy condition upon very slight occasions .... If I could have con-
trouled my rage, I am answerable for the consequences of it. But if I
could not, and if it was the mere effect of a distempered brain, I am not
answerable for the consequences. 63
Ferrer's defense was rejected on the facts, not as a matter of law. Thus,
the case represents the first instance of a court acknowledging the valid-
ity of a purely control-based insanity plea.
Hadfield's Case 64 is the first reported case documenting juror acqui-
escence in a volitional not guilty by reason of insanity plea. James Had-
field was an ex-British militiaman who was discharged from the military
due to insanity after having suffered a severe head wound in battle. He
labored under the delusion that, like Christ, he was the saviour and that
he had to be sacrificed in order to redeem humanity. Hadfield believed
60. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 20 (1803) (emphasis in original).
61. Blackstone's statement on the insanity defense was:
The second case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of crimes, arises
also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz., in an idiot or a lunatic. For the
rule of law as to the latter, which may easily be adapted also to the former, is, that
"furiosusfurore solurn punitur." (A madman is punished by his madness alone).
Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). Blackstone further observed that "[w]here there is a defect of
understanding . . . there is no discernment, there is no choice; and where there is no choice,
there can be no act of the will." Id. at 21.
62. 19 How. State Tr. 886 (Eng. 1760).
63. Id. at 945.
64. 27 How. State Tr. 1281 (Eng. 1800).
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that an assassination attempt on King George III would be the surest
path to martyrdom. Consequently, in 1799, Hadfield pursued what
amounted to high treason in order to guarantee his owni execution. 65
At trial, Thomas Erskine, counsel for the defense, pressed the theory
that Hadfield should be acquitted because Hadfield's delusions left him
with an irresistible impulse to kill the King.66 Erskine based his defense
theory on Ferrer's Case, which had required the jury to acquit when the
criminal act was performed under "the dominion of uncontrollable dis-
ease."'67 This defense tactic was necessary because the record showed
that Hadfield fully comprehended the nature of his act and the difference
between right and wrong and thus was precluded from raising an in-
sanity defense on cognitive grounds. Both the prosecutor and the court
recognized the propriety of Hadfield's volitional incapacitation defense.
With the prosecution in agreement, the court interrupted the proceedings
and suggested to the jury that, since Hadfield was unequivocally insane,
an acquittal was in order. The jury promptly returned a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity.68
The significance of Hadfield's acquittal to the historical legitimacy
of the control test should not be underestimated. In order to render a
defense verdict, the court, the prosecution, and the jury had to embrace
wholeheartedly the concept of volitional exculpation because the record
was devoid of any evidence of cognitive impairment. In his treatise, A
History of the Criminal Law of England, Stephen observed:
In this case Hadfield clearly knew the nature of his act, namely, that he
was firing a loaded horse-pistol at George III. He also knew the qual-
ity of [his] act, namely, that it was what the law calls high treason. He
also knew that it was wrong (in the sense of being forbidden by law),
for the very object for which he did it was that he might be put to
death that so the world might be saved. 69
The English courts next considered the propriety of a control test in
Regina v. Oxford,70 which was decided three years before M'Naghten.
The case involved Edward Oxford's assassination attempt against Queen
Victoria. Again, the proposition that mental disease could render a per-
65. Id. at 1319-24.
66. In the opening statement, Erskine introduced his defense of volitional incapacitation
as follows: "Gentlemen, it has pleased God so to visit the unhappy man before you; to shake
his reason in its citadel; to cause him to build up as realities, the most impossible phantoms of
the mind, and to be impelled by them as motives irresistible ...." Id. at 1315 (emphasis in
original).
67. 27 How. State Tr. at 1325.
68. Id. at 1355-56.
69. 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 159 (1883).
70. 9 Car. & P. 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840).
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son unable to control himself was recognized. In instructing the jury,
Lord Denman stated that "[i]f some controlling disease was in truth, the
acting power within [Oxford] which he could not resist, then he will not
be responsible."' 7 1 Oxford was acquitted on this basis.
C. American Case Law
The capacity to control or conform one's conduct was also of mo-
ment to early American criminal law. State v. Thompson,72 decided in
1834, was the first reported use of a control formulation. The jury in
Thompson was instructed that, in order for the defendant to be held re-
sponsible for his actions, he must have had the "power to forbear or to
do the act."'73 The power of choice terminology and the classic irresisti-
ble impulse wording were echoed approvingly in numerous later exposi-
tions of the control test.74
In Parsons v. State,75 for example, the trial court recognized that
responsibility required both cognitive ability and freedom of will. Conse-
quently, a defendant could be excused "[i]f, by reason of the duress of
such mental disease, he had so far lost the power to choose between the
right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free
agency was at the time destroyed."'76 In Parsons, the Supreme Court of
Alabama reversed the murder convictions of two defendants whose jury
had been instructed, over defense objection, that the sole basis for excul-
pation resided in the cognitive terminology of the M'Naghten formula-
71. Id. at 546, 173 Eng. Rep. at 950.
72. Wright's Ohio Rep. 617 (1834).
73. Id. at 617 (quoted in H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 54, at 135).
74. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48-49 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501-04 (1844); Commonwealth
v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 267 (1846); Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 328 (1847) ("Accountability for
crime, pre-supposes a criminal intent, and that requires a power of reasoning upon the charac-
ter and consequences of the act; a will subject to control. For this reason it is, that a homicide,
committed under the influence of incontrollable passion is not murder."); State v. Windsor, 5
Del. (Harr.) 512, 539 (1856) ("the question is not how much reason and judgment a man has,
but whether he had at the time the ability to distinguish between right and wrong in reference
to the act itself and the power to choose whether he would do it or not"; the court goes on to
quote approvingly from the charge given in Oxford's case. Id. at 540); Scott v. Common-
wealth, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 227, 230-31 (1863); State v. Felter 25 Iowa 67 (1868); Stevens v.
State, 31 Ind. 485 (1869); State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136, 142 (1873) (approving instructions
which paraphrase those given in the Oxford case in 1840); People v. Finely, 38 Mich. 482, 483
(1878) (the law "holds every one responsible who is compos mentis, or a free agent, and every
one irresponsible who is non compos mentis, or not having control of his mind."); Dejarnette v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 878-9 (1881); Dacey v. People, 116 Il1. 555, 570-71, 6 N.E. 165,
172-73 (1886); see also J. HALL, supra note 54, at 486-91; H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 54, at 46-
52, 64-65.
75. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1886).
76. Id. at 597, 2 So. at 866 (emphasis in original).
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tion. The Parsons decision quotes at great length from the writings of
numerous distinguished nineteenth century psychiatrists, jurists, and
legal commentators who believed that volitional exoneration was essen-
tial to an insanity defense that comports with science and fairness.77 The
decision specifically criticized courts that continued to rely on a purely
cognitive test of insanity for "not [keeping] pace with the progress of
thought and discovery in the present advanced stages of medical
science." 78
In Dejarnette v. Commonwealth,79 decided in 1881, the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia approved a jury charge which mandated that an accused
would not be guilty unless he possessed "a will sufficient to restrain the
impulse that may arise from a diseased mind." The court defined the
exonerating impulse as "some unseen pressure on the mind, drawing it to
consequences which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under a co-
ercion which, while its results are clearly perceived, it is incapable of
resisting."' 80 This instruction provided clear grounds for Dejarnette's ex-
culpation, as the evidence showed that he suffered from hereditary in-
sanity and killed his own sister upon discovering that she was residing in
a house of ill-repute.81
In Commonwealth v. Rogers,8 2 an 1844 decision, Chief Justice Shaw
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court similarly approved a legal test of
insanity which dictated that the accused be acquitted if it was determined
that his action "was the result of the disease and not of a mind capable of
choosing; in short, that it was the result of uncontrollable impulse, and
not of a person acted upon by motives, and governed by the will." Rog-
ers' volitional illness resulted in a jury verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity to a charge of murdering the warden of the state prison.83
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of voli-
tional exoneration in the 1846 case of Commonwealth v. Mosler.84 Chief
Justice Gibson hypothesized that the ensuing "moral" insanity might be
a product of "an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing it to
consequences which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under a co-
ercion, which, while its results are clearly perceived, is incapable of
77. Id at 583-95, 2 So. at 858-865.
78. Id at 582, 2 So. at 857.
79. 75 Va. 867, 878 (1881).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 869.
82. 48-49 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 503 (1844).
83. Id. at 506.
84. 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
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resistance. '85 While acknowledging the validity of volitional insanity,
the Mosler court cautioned against an expansive reading of such grounds
for exculpation. 86 Nevertheless, Mosler was convicted of the premedi-
tated murder of his wife. The jury was undoubtedly moved by testimony
that the accused had immediately stated upon arrest that" 'he was ready
to go anywhere' . ..'he had tried to do it before' ... 'had done it this
time right' . . . [and] 'she had never treated him right.' "87
D. The Impact of M'Naghten
Given the significant precedent supporting the exculpatory impact
of defects of control, the concept of volitional exoneration would seem to
have been secure. Not surprisingly, the argument has been persuasively
and repeatedly made that the articulation of the M'Naghten test of excus-
able insanity was not meant to restrict the bounds of the insanity defense
to purely cognitive grounds.88 Sir James Stephen's A History of the Crim-
inal Law of England presents an exhaustive analysis of the limited pur-
pose for which the M'Naghten rules were promulgated.8 9  Stephen
objected to the advisory nature of the M'Naghten rules. He believed that
because the facts of M'Naghten raised only the question of knowledge,
the judges narrowly interpreted the questions posed for their considera-
tion in a manner which avoided the articulation of a general statement of
the law regarding the insanity defense.90 Stephen noted that Hadfield
would most certainly have been found guilty under the M'Naghten for-
mulation. He believed that M'Naghten's failure to distinguish or ex-
pressly overrule Hadfield was further evidence that the judiciary did not
see itself as having effectuated a wholesale reworking of the English in-
85. Id. at 267. The Mosler decision did recognize the inherent tendency of such a doc-
trine for expansion and recommended that it be "recognized only in the clearest cases," limited
in application to instances where the inability to control behavior is "shown to have been
habitual, or at least to have evinced itself in more than a single instance" because to do other-
wise "would destroy social order as well as personal safety." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 265.
88. Crotty, supra note 54, at 118.
89. J. STEPHEN, supra note 69, at 153-60. Stephen is not alone in this perception.
M'Naghten's trial counsel, who later was elevated to Chief Justice of the Court of Common
Pleas, believed that the M'Naghten rules "embodied only so much of the law as sufficed to
answer the specific questions that had been submitted." OPPENHEIMER, THE CRIMINAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICs 26 (1909); see also Barnes, A Century of the McNaghten Rules, 8
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 300, 310 (1944) ("The effect of insanity on the will could not arise on the
Questions put to the judges, for such a question was not asked, the Questions refer to 'insane
delusion.' ").
90. J. STEPHEN, supra note 69, at 154-55.
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sanity defense. 91
The argument that M'Naghten did not prohibit a volitional insanity
defense is strengthened by the fact that Lord Denman fully concurred in
the advisory opinion which followed M'Naghten's acquittal. 92 Lord
Denman, it must be remembered, presided over the Oxford trial only
three years before the M'Naghten rules were promulgated. The validity
of Oxford's volitionally-based insanity defense had been expressly ac-
knowledged by Lord Denman in his charge to the jury and, on that basis,
the jury found Oxford not responsible.93 Consequently, it is highly un-
likely that, only three years later, Lord Denman would have been in
agreement with the advisory opinion in M'Naghten had he viewed it as
addressing the insanity defense in its entirety rather than merely the ap-
propriate test for "insane delusions. '94
In any event, English treatises and precedent clearly reflect the fact
that the genealogy of the control test can be traced to mid-eighteenth
century England. Moreover, the propriety of the test was acknowledged
on both sides of the Atlantic well before the promulgation of
M'Naghten.95
III. The Constitutional Dimension
The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
question of the constitutionality of the insanity defense or the subsidiary
question of whether volitional or cognitive incapacitation are constitu-
tionally required as part of the defense formulation. Lower courts have
held that the right to plead not guilty by reason of insanity is either: (1)
an essential component of the fifth amendment's due process clause, and
the rights to a fair trial, to present a defense, or to trial by jury, implicit
in the concept of due process, (2) or is protected by the eighth amend-
ment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. 96 No court,
91. Id at 159-61.
92. Lord Denman was one of the judges deciding M'Naghten and did not file a separate
opinion. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
93. Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525, 546, 173 Eng. Rep. 941, 950 (1840).
94. Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
956, 961 (1952).
95. The United States' early tendency was to rely upon English decisions for defining the
law of insanity. See Crotty, supra note 54, at 121 and authorities cited therein.
96. The Supreme Court of Washington declared a state statute barring the insanity plea
unconstitutional in State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 121, 110 P. 1020, 1024 (1910). The
Washington court cited the "rule of law in every civilized country that no insane man can be
guilty of a crime, and hence cannot be-punished for what would otherwise be a crime." Id at
114, 110 P. at 1022. The court found that the right to plead insanity had been a "right prior to
and at the time of adoption of our Constitution" and, therefore, is fundamental and an element
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however, has held that a particular definition of the insanity defense is of
constitutional dimension. Indeed, little has been written regarding the
constitutional perspective on the question of the volitional insanity
plea.97 This section analyzes the constitutional dimension of the insanity
defense in terms of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause98 and the fifth amendment's due process clause. 99
A. The Eighth Amendment and Volitional Insanity
(1) Punishment for Uncontrollable Acts Violates the Eighth Amendment
Constitutional analysis of a volitionally based insanity defense under
the eighth amendment must begin with the Supreme Court's decisions in
Powell v. Texas o00 and Robinson v. California. 101 In Powell, the Supreme
Court upheld a statute criminalizing public drunkenness over defense ob-
of due process. Id. at 115, 110 P. at 1022. The court interpreted the right to trial by jury as
guaranteeing "the right to have the jury pass upon every substantive fact going to the question
of his guilt or innocence." Id. at 118, 110 P. at 1022; see also Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142,
164, 132 So. 581, 585 (1931) (per curiam) (Ethridge, J., concurring) ("[T]here could be no
greater cruelty than trying, convicting, and punishing a person wholly unable to understand
the nature and consequence of his act, and that such punishment is certainly both cruel and
unusual in the constitutional sense."); State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929) (statute
making finding of lunacy commission final violates right to jury trial). Other decisions, while
not squarely on point, indicate acceptance for the proposition that some sort of insanity de-
fense is constitutionally required: United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 1041 (1974); Ingles v. People, 92 Colo.
518, 522, 22 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1933) ("A statute providing that insanity shall be no defense to a
criminal charge would be unconstitutional."); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 639, 643, 564 P.2d
1154, 1156 (1977) ("It would clearly be unconstitutional to permit the conviction of a defend-
ant who was legally insane at the time of the commission of the crime."). But see State v.
Korell, 41 Mont. 2141, 690 P.2d 992, 999-1000 (1984) (rejecting defendant's contention that
the insanity defense vitiated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments or was so
firmly established in the common law at the time the Constitution was adopted as to be a
fundamental right protected by the due process clause). Three states have recently abolished
the insanity defense by statute: IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1987) (1982 amendment abandoning
ALI); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-14-102 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1988).
97. The only federal case to analyze the Act's abolition of a control test rejected an eighth
amendment challenge in summary fashion. See United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574,
1576-77 (lth Cir. 1986). In an equally conclusory manner, two reported state cases have
refused to find the excisement of a control test to be unconstitutional. See Hicks v. State, 256
Ga. 715, 352 S.E.2d 762, 775 (1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3220 (1984); Hart v. State, 702
P.2d 651, 658-59 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
98. The eighth amendment provides, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
99. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part, "[n]o person shall... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The provision
is made binding upon the States through parallel language in section 1 of the fourteenth
aniendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
101. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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jection that the prosecution of chronic alcoholics under the statute vio-
lated the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 102 In rejecting the
defendant's contention that his alcoholism caused him to suffer from an
irresistible impulse to drink and, therefore, that he could not be subjected
to punishment constitutionally, the Court analogized:
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into
defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms. ... If a
person in the "condition" of being a chronic alcoholic cannot be crimi-
nally punished as a constitutional matter for being drunk in public, it
would seem to follow that a person who contends that, in terms of one
test, "his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect," would state an issue of constitutional dimension with regard to
his criminal responsibility had he been tried under some different and
perhaps lesser standard, e.g., the right-wrong test of M'Naghten's
Case. 103
While the language quoted is clearly dicta, Powell's relevance to the
constitutional bounds of the insanity defense is readily distinguished be-
cause a disease theory of alcoholism has never commanded significant
legal support. Regardless of whether the chronic alcoholic is unable to
control himself, he is typically viewed as having voluntarily brought his
condition upon himself when he first made the focal choice to drink. l04
Mental illness, on the other hand, has never, at least in modem
times, beeji viewed as a condition which a person can choose either to
impose upon himself or to forego. 10 5 The Powell Court's primary objec-
102. Powell, 392 U.S. at 517. The Texas statute provided that "[w]hoever shall get drunk
or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his
own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 477
(1952).
103. Powell, 392 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted).
104. Id at 522, 526. Although five members of the Court voted to uphold Powel's con-
viction, they failed to agree on a rationale. Four of the justices in the vote to affirm acknowl-
edged the differences in medical opinion over whether alcoholism is a disease. The issue was
recently before the Supreme Court, although in a context quite outside the criminal arena, that
being the propriety of denying veteran's educational benefits to former alcoholics. The Court,
however, specifically declined the opportunity to address the question. Traynor v. Turage,
108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988); see also United States v. Shuckahosee, 609 F.2d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir.
1979) (characterization of alcoholism as a disease is not the predominant mental opinion);
Springer v. Collins, 586 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1978) (The only possible basis for suggesting
the defense of insanity was the fact the defendant used drugs and alcohol excessively at the
time of the offense.). For a recent challenge to the medical theory of alcoholism, see H. FIN-
GARETrE, HEAVY DRINKING-THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE (1988). The same
can be said for narcotics addiction. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1151 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) ("[D]efendant could never put the needle in his arm the first
and many succeeding times thereafter without an exercise of will.").
105. "In ancient times, lunatics were not regarded as 'unfortunate sufferers from disease,
but rather as subjects of demoniacal possession, or as self-made victims of evil passions.' They
were not cared for humanely in asylums and hospitals, but were incarcerated in jails, punished
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tion to defining the insanity defense in constitutional terms centered on
the concern that "formulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not
eliminate,... fruitful experimentation, and freeze the developing produc-
tive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional
mold."' 10 6 Significantly, the Court did not say that an insanity defense
was not constitutionally mandated. The record in Powell presented the
case of a man who, while chronically alcoholic, nevertheless fully admit-
ted his ability to stop drinking after one drink.10 7 In fact, the evidence
showed that Powell had only one drink on the morning of his trial. 10 8
Thus, the Court was not squarely confronted with an individual who was
powerless to control himself.
A defendant whose mental disease compromises his ability to con-
trol his behavior is in a considerably different position. The overriding
concern from a constitutional perspective is not so much a question of
the ambit of the insanity defense, but rather the more basic question of
whether mentally ill persons should or should not be punished for be-
havior which is beyond their power to control. While the particulars of
the insanity defense may not be viewed as an issue of constitutional di-
mension, the eighth amendment undoubtedly sets the minimum constitu-
tional standards for the defense.' 0 9 In Robinson v. California, the case
upon which the four dissenting justices in Powell principally relied, Jus-
tice Stewart implicitly drew the constitutional bottom line when he
wrote: "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punish-
ment for the 'crime' of having, a common cold." 110
In Robinson, the Court overturned the conviction of a man found
guilty of the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics."" 1 The
Robinson decision, however, was founded on far more than a simple ac-
knowledgement of the need for an actus reus to define a crime. The Pow-
ell dissenters viewed Robinson as resting on a principle that "is the
foundation of individual liberty and the cornerstone of the relations be-
tween a civilized state and its citizens: Criminal penalties may not be
inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to
with chains and stripes, and often sentenced to death by burning or the gibbet." Parsons v.
State, 81 Ala. 577, 583, 2 So. 854, 858 (1886).
106. Powell, 392 U.S. at 536-37.
107. Id. at 519.
108. Id.
109. Cf. id. at 544-45 (Black, J., concurring) (Black, while sympathetic to a rule of law
that would require more blame worthiness as a condition precedent for guilt, nevertheless
believed that the issue was not of constitutional magnitude).
110. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1939).
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change."1 12
The eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments draws its meaning from "the evolving standards of decency [that]
mark the progress of a maturing society." 113 Early eighth amendment
jurisprudence directed this principle solely to the type and degree of pun-
ishment inflicted.1 14 In Robinson, however, as Justice Douglas explains
in his concurrence, the Court extended eighth amendment analysis to
include the very definition of criminality. Douglas captured the
profound moral contours of the question noting that the Court "would
forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if [it] allowed sickness to
be made a crime and permitted sick people to be punished for being sick.
This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action."115
The Douglas opinion elucidates the importance of the holding for mark-
ing the proper bounds of the insanity defense, admonishing that "insanity
... is in end effect treated as a disease. While afflicted people may be
confined either for treatment or for the protection of society, they are not
branded as criminals."116 Just as the eighth amendment was interpreted
in Robinson as dictating that conduct that is an inevitable consequence of
addiction must not be criminalized, 117 so too, conduct that is the uncon-
trollable product of mental affliction should not be punished as criminal.
(2) Punishing the Volitionally Insane Does Not Further Any of the Goals of
Criminal Sanctions
The eighth amendment further requires that a punishment neither
violate contemporary standards of decency nor the "'dignity of man'
which ... means, at least, that the punishment [must] not be 'exces-
sive.' 1118 The latter term is defined by classic eighth amendment analy-
sis as involving "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."119
Accordingly, if none of the legitimate legislative goals of punishment are
112. Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
113. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
114. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
115. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 668-69.
117. In Robinson, the majority opinion catalogued the conduct which the state could per-
missibly prohibit but omitted the use of narcotics. Id at 664. Justice White's dissenting opin-
ion perceived this to be a deliberate omission. He relies upon this omission to support reading
the case as having proscribed criminalization of conduct that is integral to the addiction, such
as possession or use of narcotics. As White put it, "punishing an addict for using drugs con-
victs for addiction under a different name." This is the brunt of the dissenters' positions in
Powell, for they argue that the defendant, once intoxicated, could not prevent himself from
appearing in public. See Powell, 370 U.S. at 685 (White, 3., dissenting).
118. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
119. Id.
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furthered by punishing those who run afoul of the criminal law due to
volitional illness, then such punishment is unnecessary, and, conse-
quently, constitutionally infirm. Since the proper definition of the in-
sanity defense hinges upon the relevance of punishment theory, a brief
excursion into the traditional bases for the institution of penal sanctions
is in order. In evaluating the relevance of punishment theory to the ques-
tion of volitional insanity, however, two points must be acknowledged.
First, the common law recognized mental incapacity as a defense to
criminality since the twelfth century when the law "moved from a con-
cept of strict liability to one based on fault,"1 20 and thus, blameworthi-
ness is, through long standing tradition, a condition precedent for guilt.
Second, an insanity acquittal, although an acquittal, nevertheless consti-
tutes "punishment" because it results in involuntary and indeterminate
confinement, and the stigma ensuing from such confinement is itself a
considerable sanction. 12'
Historically, criminal punishments have been justified by the follow-
ing theories: restraint (also known as incapacitation or specific deter-
rence), rehabilitation, general deterrence (or education), and
retribution. 22 Restraint is perhaps the most straightforward theory. So-
ciety deserves to be protected from the criminal actions of its members.
By incarcerating criminal offenders, society ensures that dangerous per-
sons will be precluded from jeopardizing the security of others, regard-
less of whether wrongdoers are to be confined in an environment that
might be successful in modifying their criminal proclivities. 23
In actuality, the restraint of a volitionally diseased offender in a pe-
nal institution undermines this goal, for society is afforded no guarantee
that psychiatric treatment will be provided within the confines of the pe-
nal setting. Present law, however, typically provides that insanity acquit-
tees be automatically, involuntarily, and indefinitely committed 24 to an
120. Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 559-60 (1972). A penal code which views mental impairment as
having no bearing on the definition of criminality would, of course, punish even a mentally ill
offender for the safety of society. This, however, is not the position of the American criminal
justice system which emphasizes "moral guilt, rather than guilt based on action alone." Id. at
560.
121. The Act expressly authorizes automatic and indefinite commitment of a federal in-
sanity acquittee in a mental facility approved by the Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C § 4243(a)
(1986).
122. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 306-08 (2d ed. 1986).
123. Id. at 23-24.
124. See supra note 121; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (describing
the District of Columbia committal statute, which requires a criminal defendant who is found
not guilty by reason of insanity to be confined in a mental institution until he has regained
sanity or is no longer a threat to society).
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institution where mental health treatment is arguably constitutionally
guaranteed. 125 Therefore, the long range interests of society in re-
straining the dangerous are far better served by inclusion of a control test
in the definition of excusable insanity. Moreover, to hold otherwise is to
ignore the fact that crime can continue behind bars if the crime is truly
motivated by irresistible impulses resulting from mental disease. By defi-
nition, an offender who is incapable of conforming himself to the require-
ments of the law is undeterrable. I26 To naively assume that such an
offender's criminality will cease while he is incarcerated is to ignore the
fact that his misconduct is psychologically compelled.
Rehabilitation theory is based on the premise that crime is the prod-
uct of identifiable antecedent causes. Further, this theory posits that
therapeutic measures can be employed during the prison experience to
motivate the offender to reform his behavior to comport with the rule of
law. 127 In order to facilitate this reformation, the rehabilitative model
contemplates the provision of resources, such as educational and job
training services, to an offender who has the capacity to change. The
success of the rehabilitative model hinges on the extent and propriety of
the services provided. 128 Prisoners enjoy no right to rehabilitative serv-
ices and overburdened legislatures have been reluctant to provide such
programming. 129 Moreover, there is widespread doubt "that rehabilita-
tion can be induced reliably in a prison setting."' 130
These concerns, when coupled with the general perception that the
rehabilitation of the insane offender is best achieved by means that differ
from those utilized for the rehabilitation of the sane offender,13' lead to
the conclusion that the insanity acquittee is more likely to be rehabili-
tated if confined in an institution that is primarily focused on psychiatric
intervention. Since the volitionally impaired offender is by definition a
125. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
126. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 12-13 (1967). The deterrence theory of
punishment "can be effective only with men who can understand the signals directed at them
by the [criminal] code, who can respond to warnings, and who can feel the significance of the
sanctions imposed upon violators." Id. at 13.
127. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, JR., supra note 122, at 24.
128. Martinson, Sentencing, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sen-
tencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. Rlv. 243, 244-45 (1979).
129. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012-3 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 266
(1968).
130. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, ON THE COMPREHEN-
SIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1983, S. 1762, S. REP. No. 225, 238, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
131. Note, Madness in the Criminal Law, 40 TEMPLE L.Q. 348, 360 (1967) (authored by
Helen H. Stem).
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criminal as a consequence of his suffering from a mental disease, refor-
mation of his criminality is best accomplished by his commitment to a
psychiatric rather than a penal institution.
General deterrence theory contemplates punishment of the criminal
offender as an example to the larger society. 132 This goal of using the
offender as an object lesson to others is the essence of the utilitarian the-
ory of punishment, first articulated by Jeremy Bentham. 133 This goal is
poorly served by punishment of the volitionally insane, however, because
the educational value of such an action is de minimis. Healthy members
of society are hard pressed to generalize from the experience of the men-
tally ill. 134 It is inconceivable that any individual concerned about, and
capable of, conforming his conduct to the behavioral norms of society
would fail to acknowledge that crime is "wrong" as a result of the exon-
eration of the insane. 135 More critically, punishment of volitionally im-
paired individuals, who are recognized as incapable of controlling their
criminal misconduct, would only blur the distinction between good and
bad, thereby actually undermining the deterrent value of criminal law.
Retribution theory is premised on the belief that the criminal trans-
gressor owes society a measure of suffering simply because he has occa-
sioned suffering by his crime. A critical tenet of retributive theory,
however, is "the fact that human beings possess free will-i.e., their con-
duct is not determined by factors external to their will,"' 136 and, there-
fore, "[p]unishment is deserved because the wrongdoer made the choice
to commit the offense." 137 Thus, free will is an essential condition prece-
dent to punishment under a retributive rationale. Consequently, the con-
viction and imprisonment of the insane is diametrically opposed to true
retributive precepts. Indeed, the very evolution of the insanity defense
was the product of society's desire to remove from retributive punish-
132. W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 122, at 24-25.
133. See generally J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION ch. XIII (1789).
134. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 126, at 13. With regard to general deterrence, Goldstein
observes: "[T]he examples are likely to deter only if the person who is not involved in the
criminal process regards the lessons as applicable to him" which he is likely to do "only if he
identifies with the offender and with the offending situation." Id. Given the stigma associated
with mental illness, it is highly unlikely that the sane offender will psychologically identify
with an insane defendant and thus, punishment of an insane offender as a deterrence example
to others is of little practical utility. Further, "[iut would be widely regarded as incalculably
cruel and unjust to incarcerate men who are not personally responsible in order to serve social
functions." Id.; see also Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1 37
COLUM. L. REV. 701, 752-57 (1937).
135. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 122, at 307.
136. J. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at § 2.03[C][1].
137. Id.
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ment those who were so psychologically deficient that they could not be
blamed justly for their misconduct. 138 As Holmes has noted, "[e]ven a
dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." 139
In sum, as was stated in United States v. Freeman, 140 the Second
Circuit decision, which adopted the ALI formulation, "society has recog-
nized over the years that none of the three asserted purposes of the crimi-
nal law-rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution-is satisfied when
the truly irresponsible, those who lack substantial capacity to control
their actions, are punished."' 141
(3) Punishment of the Volitionally Insane is Cruel and Unusual in Light of
Evolving Standards of Decency
Punishment is pointless when it does not serve the legitimate goals
of a penal code.142 Therefore, any effort to punish the volitionally im-
paired offender clearly involves wanton infliction of pain. Language
from Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Ford v. Wainwright 143 is es-
pecially apposite: "Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from
fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity
of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the
restriction [against executing an insane defendant] finds enforcement in
the Eighth Amendment."' 144
While Ford stands for the limited proposition that an insane defend-
ant has a constitutional right not to be executed, the decision also embod-
ies the Supreme Court's most recent analysis of the relationship between
the eighth amendment and insanity. In Ford, the Court viewed the
eighth amendment bar as "embrac[ing], at a minimum, those modes or
acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the
time that the Bill of Rights was adopted."' 145 By the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted, the common law had established "the border line of
punishability,"' 46 so as to avoid "deal[ing] harshly with any unfortunate
138. The retributive notion of "an eye for an eye.. ." presupposes a rough equality of
exchange. The insane offender's eye, clouded as it is by mental infirmity, will never cancel the
account.
139. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (1963).
140. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
141. Id. at 615 (citing W. MOBERLY, REPONSIBILrrY 1-24 (1956)).
142. Cf United States v. Torniero, 570 F. Supp. 721 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 725,
728 (2d Cir. 1984) (referencing the government's arguments stating why the existence of the
insanity defense is inconsistent with punishment theory), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985).
143. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
144. Id. at 410.
145. Id. at 405 (citation omitted).
146. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 594, 2 So. 858, 865 (1886).
November 1988]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
victim of a diseased mind, acting without the light of reason or the power
of volition."' 47 The essential relationship at common law was absolute:
"there is no person to be punished, to whom the law hath denied a
will," 148 and again, "[t]he Guilt of offending against any Law . . . can
never justly be imputed to those who are either uncapable of understand-
ing it, or of conforming themselves to it." 149
In view of the common law legacy proscribing punishment of the
volitionally impaired offender, the rationale of Ford implies that such a
practice would violate the eighth amendment. Nevertheless, assuming
arguendo that the common law was not so free from ambiguity, in inter-
preting the mandate of the eighth amendment, the analysis is "[n]ot
bound by the sparing humanitarian concessions of our forebears.' '1 50
The eighth amendment dictates that the power to punish "be exercised
within the limits of civilized standards," 151 which are not static, but
evolve as a society matures.' 5 2
Prior to the Hinckley case, each federal circuit to consider the voli-
tional insanity defense had adopted the ALI test which, in pertinent part,
excused those offenders whose mental infirmity caused them to lack the
substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of the
law.' 53 The Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Freeman 154 is
typical of the federal courts' thorough rejection of a purely cognitive test.
There, the M'Naghten rule was decried as "an outmoded standard, sorely
at variance with enlightened medical and legal scholarship."' 155 The
147. Id.
148. W. LAMBARD, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
149. W. HAWKINS, supra note 59, at 1.
150. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986).
151. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
152. Id. at 100-01.
153. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding
that Fifth Circuit decisions prior to September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc); United States
v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th
Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 916 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith,
404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir.
1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman,
357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48, 52 (Ist Cir. 1962) (the
First Circuit, while never formally adopting any insanity test, in this decision commended the
trial court for its reliance on United States v. Currens in which the Third Circuit adopted the
ALI formulation); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961) (adopting the
volitional prong of the ALI test as the sole standard). The federal circuits drew their provi-
sions for volitional exculpation directly from the ALI test, which appears supra note 6.
154. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
155. Id. at 624.
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M'Naghten test was shown to have been based on understandings of the
human mind that devolved from a period of time when psychiatry was,
at best, an inchoate art, and belief in witchcraft was commonplace. 56
Both "It]he tremendous growth of psychiatric knowledge since the Victo-
rian origins of M'Naghten" and "the near-universal disdain in which it is
held by present day psychiatrists"'' 5 7 were cited in support of the decision
to abandon the M'Naghten formulation and adopt the ALI standard.
Psychiatry was described as having "for many years ... urged, almost
with one voice, the replacement of the M'Naghten rule."' 5 8 Moreover,
the critics referred to in Freeman were not limited to the medical field.
Freeman cited Justice Cardozo's disavowal of the relevance of
M'Naghten to "the truths of mental life." 159 In addition, Freeman relied
on Justice Frankfurter's testimony before the Royal Commission on Cap-
ital Punishment to underscore further the critique: "I do not see why the
rules of law should be arrested at the state of psychological knowledge of
the time when they were formulated .... I think that the M'Naghten
Rules are in large measure shams."' 160 Articles documenting Justice
Brennan's and Justice Douglas' dissatisfaction with M'Naghten were also
cited. 161 Ultimately, the M'Naghten standard was jettisoned in favor of
adopting of the ALI test. The ALI standard was viewed as effectuating a
rational integration of evolving understandings of the essential medical
and legal nature of criminal responsibility.162 Nevertheless, federal
courts employed the ALI test of volitional incapacitation for less than
twenty-five years before Congress struck it down.
Even opponents of the volitional prong of the ALI test, however,
readily concede the existence of the type of mentally ill offender it was
designed to protect. Professor Bonnie, for example, fully accepted "the
moral predicate for a control test"' 63 in his congressional testimony.
Nonetheless, he favored amputation of the volitional impairment limb
156. Id. at 616 n.24 and authorities cited therein.
157. Id. at 619.
158. Id at 623 n.53.
159. Id. at 619 (quoting B. CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN DO FOR LAW 32 (1930)).
160. Id (quoting REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 102
(1953)). The Report recommended that England abandon M'Naghten in favor of a formula-
tion that also authorized claims of volitional impairment. Id at n.42.
161. Id. at n.42 (citing Brennan, Psychiatry Must Join in Defending Mentally Ill Criminals,
49 A.B.A. J. 239 (1960); Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and
Psychiatrists, 41 IOWA L. REv. 485 (1956).
162. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 623-24.
163. The Insanity Defense, 1982. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 276-77 (1982), quoted in S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, 226,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.-NEws 3182, 3408.
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from the body of excusable insanity because he believed that "there is no
scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for self-control.' 64
Bonnie's position, to further Holmes' analogy, 165 is that (1) it is immoral
to fail to acknowledge that some offenders stumble, while others kick; (2)
but since the societal dog is unable to tell whether he has been the victim
of a kick or a stumble; (3) the dog must assume that he has been kicked
and punish the perpetrator accordingly. Stated thusly, the postulates of
the abolitionist argument squarely contravene the presumption of inno-
cence and the corollary precept of our criminal justice system that de-
fines the government's burden of proof so as "to exclude as nearly as
possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment."' 166 The Act reverses
these assumptions, contending that when there is a lack of proof, doubt
should be resolved in a manner categorically adverse to the volitionally
impaired accused.
The speciousness of the position of those who favor abolition of the
volitional test is further illustrated by analogy to the general requirement
of criminal law that the defendant's guilt be established beyond a reason-
able doubt. Beyond a reasonable doubt is a state of certitude reached
through a subjective assessment rather than a mathematical tallying of
objectively verifiable quanta of proof. Judges and juries since time imme-
morial have attained this level of certainty regardless of the fact that it is
generally impossible to verify empirically the matters in issue. When
such intangible matters as intent and adequacy of provocation are in is-
sue, a conviction, even an appropriate one, can hardly be said to rest on
evidence that can be viewed objectively as meeting the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard. The subjective nature of the determination of guilt
or innocence hardly bespeaks its infirmity; rather, it acts to define the line
164. Id. Professor Bonnie's position is fully set forth in The Moral Basis of the Insanity
Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 196 (1983). Some commentators have stated this position in more
extremist terms. See, e.g., Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 589 (1978) ("We simply do not and cannot have a
scientifically proven answer to the question of whether crazy persons or normal persons have
free will."); Wootton, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1019, 1027 (1968) ("[I]t is not only difficult
to devise a test of volitional competence the validity of which can be objectively established: it
is impossible.").
165. See supra text accompanying note 139.
166. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). Historically, the criminal justice sys-
tem has placed a high premium on ensuring that innocent men are not convicted of crime.
This belief in the markedly greater disutility of convicting the innocent versus acquitting the
guilty was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),
and is supported by the common law record as well. Hale, for example, stated that five guilty
men should go free before one innocent is convicted; Blackstone favored a ratio of ten to one;
Fortescue defined the ratio for capital cases as twenty to one. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the
Fact Finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1077 n.l1 (1968).
[Vol. 40
VOLITIONAL INSANITY DEFENSE
between guilt and innocence more brilliantly by basing the division on
the jury's collective assessment of the rightness of the accusation. Of
course, the jury, as the moral spokespersons, of the community, is
uniquely qualified to make this determination.
The Act's legislative history conceded that a control test furthers the
ends of the insanity defense by excluding nondeterrables from criminal
responsibility and preventing retributive judgments from being executed
against them. 167 Nevertheless, Congress excised the volitional prong be-
cause psychiatrists were viewed widely as adhering to an absolutist deter-
minism which perceives all criminal conduct as caused by
conformational impairment. 168 No hard evidence was offered in support
of this broadside against forensic psychiatry.
In point of fact, the case for a control test rests on two precepts. 169
First, the empirical proposition that mental disease can impair an indi-
vidual's capacity to choose to obey the law. Second, the moral proposi-
tion that such an individual cannot fairly be blamed for criminal acts that
are the product of his mental compulsion. The second precept enjoys
widespread acceptance in the legal and medical communities 70 Indeed,
few could disagree with the morality inherent in the idea that those who
cannot help from violating the penal code due to psychological infirmity
are not blameworthy. Nor is there "reason to doubt that such persons
exist."' 171 While Congress acknowledged this moral imperative, it chose
to ignore the obvious ramifications for the proper scope of the insanity
defense. Congress based its decision to delete the control test on the
claimed inability of psychiatry to reliably identify the population of con-
formationally defective offenders. Absent any empirical research to sub-
stantiate psychiatry's claim, Congress was ill-advised to abandon a
principle that is so vital to the moral fabric of the criminal law.
167. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, 226, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3408, provides:
Conceptually, there is some appeal to a defense predicated on lack of power to avoid
criminal conduct. If one conceives the major purpose of the insanity defense to be
the exclusion of the nondeterrables from criminal responsibility, a control test seems
designed to meet that objective. Furthermore, notions of retributive punishment
seem particularly inappropriate with respect to one powerless to do otherwise than
he did.
168. tr If this in fact were the viewpoint of the defendants' psychiatrists, they would
never survive cross-examination.
169. This much is clear from Bonnie's own textbook. R. BONNIE, P. Low & J. JEFFERIES,
JR., CRIMINAL LAW 693-95 (2d ed. 1982).
170. Mda at 693.
171. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 134, at 754.
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In Morissette v. United States, 172 a decision described as addressing
"questions both fundamental and far-reaching in federal criminal
law,"' 173 the Supreme Court observed that "[b]elief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil" is a contention that is "universal and per-
sistent in mature systems of law." 174 The American criminal justice sys-
tem "postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing
right and wrong, and choosing freely to do wrong."' 175 When the capac-
ity to choose is deficient, the offender cannot be convicted and punished
consistent with the moral bounds of the criminal law, for "[o]ur collec-
tive conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose
blame."' 176 Time and time again the ancestral principle has been af-
firmed: "[T]here can be no criminality in the sense of moral shortcoming
if there is no freedom of choice or normality of will capable of exercising
a free choice."' 177
In light of the fundamental relationship between blameworthiness
and the power to choose, the cruelty inherent in convicting the volition-
ally defective offender is patent. When modern day psychiatry's ac-
knowledgement of the existence of volitionally impaired offenders' 78 and
the eighth amendment's evolving ban against cruel and unusual punish-
ments 179 are viewed in conjunction, the constitutionality of the Act's
wholesale abdication of a federal insanity defense based on defects of
control is seriously called into question. 80
172. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
173. Id. at 247.
174. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 250 n.4, (quoting Pound, Introduction to SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW, at
xxxvi-xxxvii (1927)).
176. Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 852 (1948).
177. Sayre, supra note 54, at 1004; see United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir.
1961); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
178. APA Statement, supra note 18, at 685.
179. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
180. Here, Congress has authorized the conviction and punishment of mentally ill persons
whose illness renders them unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of law and
whose violation of the law is a direct consequence of their affliction. It is this, the punishment
of sickness and its incidents, which Robinson forbids; for, as the Court observed, "in the light
of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease [as
mental illness] would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). This statement has been
viewed as evidence of the Supreme Court's reluctance to abolish the insanity defense, Robit-
scher & Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9, 57 (1982), a reluctance
which must be taken into account in assessing the rights of a volitionally incapacitated
offender.
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B. The Fifth Amendment and Volitional Insanity
(1) The Volitional Insanity Defense is Protected by the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause as Fundamental
In view of the longstanding relationship between blameworthiness
and free will,181 the due process clause of the fifth amendment is impli-
cated when a defendant is labelled a criminal for conduct that resulted
from mental illness. The Supreme Court has long held that conviction of
a defendant whose mental disease renders him incompetent to stand trial
violates the due process clause.182 The argument against criminalizing
the actions of a volitionally impaired offender rests on parallel considera-
tions. If it is unfair to convict one who is psychologically unable to assist
in his own defense, it would seem even more unfair to convict one who is
psychologically unable to forego crime. In the first instance, the defend-
ant commits a crime only to have his mental infirmity strip him of all
ability to meaningfully defend; in the second, the defendant's psychologi-
cal infirmity strips him of the very ability to keep from violating the law,
though the ensuing accusation is understood. Because both situations
involve the conviction of someone who, due to mental illness, is funda-
mentally unresponsive to the rule of law, both raise issues of essential
fairness that are crystallized in the concept of substantive due process.
The Supreme Court's construction of the doctrine of substantive due
process prevents official action that "offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."183 In Palko v. Connecticut 184 the same standard for defin-
ing the scope of due process was expressed in terms of a "scheme of
ordered liberty." It is not difficult to establish protection for the volition-
ally impaired offender under either of these notions of substantive due
process.
The ancient jurisprudential pedigree of volitional exoneration has
been exhaustively documented. 185 The historical record indicates that
recognition of the control test antedated the drafting of the United States
Constitution. Accordingly, a strong argument exists that a volitional in-
capacitation test was so firmly established in the common law of crimes
and defenses at the time the Constitution was adopted as to render inclu-
181. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (holding that criminal
intent is an essential element of the crime of knowing conversion of government property).
182. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956), cited with approval in Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
183. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citations omitted).
184. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
185. See supra section II.
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sion of a control test a fundamental right protected by the fifth amend-
ment due process clause.
In the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice,'86 the source of the
fundamental relationship between criminal liability and blameworthiness
is identified as "recent United States Supreme Court decisions imply[ing]
... the fairness concerns underlying 'substantive' due process and the
proportionality idea associated with the cruel-and-unusual-punishment
clause." 187 The document cites Robinson v. California 188 and Lambert v.
California 189 as authority.
In Lambert, a convicted felon was prosecuted for failing to comply
with a Los Angeles municipal ordinance requiring all felons to register
with the city. The trial court rejected the defendant's offer of proof re-
garding her lack of knowledge of the requirement because, on its face and
as construed by the state courts, the ordinance required no proof of in-
tentional disobedience to convict. 190 In reversing the defendant's convic-
tion on due process grounds, the Supreme Court observed that
application of the ordinance resulted in the criminalization of behavior in
the "absence of an opportunity to avoid the consequences of the law or to
defend any prosecution brought under it.,191
The Insanity Defense Reform Act has left the conformationally de-
fective offender in a similar quandary. Like the defendant in Lambert,
the volitionally impaired offender violates the criminal law involuntarily,
and yet is deprived of any opportunity to avoid the consequences of the
law or to raise a defense on that basis. Denial of the volitional insanity
defense violates the due process clause for the same reasons espoused in
Lambert.
(2) Abolition of the Volitional Insanity Defense Violates the Related Sixth
Amendment Right to Present a Defense
The Act's excision of a control test also violates the due process
clause by compromising the volitionally impaired offender's derivative
right to present a defense and to present supportive witnesses. In Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 192 the Supreme Court held that the right to present a
186. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 19.
187. Id. at § 7-6.1, 301-02 n.38.
188. 370 U.S. 660 (1982).
189. 355 U.S. 225 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 937 (1958). Also cited as authority is
Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE
L.J. 1325, 1370-79 (1979).
190. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 227.
191. Id. at 229.
192. 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); accord Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).
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defense under the sixth amendment is a fundamental component of due
process. As a restriction on this potentially expansive doctrine, the
Chambers Court cautioned that the accused "must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness
and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." 193 The Act,
however, as applied to the volitionally compromised offender, results in a
conviction obtained through a process that is neither fair nor reliable. A
sick person is prosecuted for acts precipitated by his disease, and then is
stripped of all opportunity to plead his affliction in his own defense. Fol-
lowing the inevitable conviction, he is punished even though his condi-
tion places him outside the scope of any of the legitimate bases for penal
sanctions. 194
This spectacle contravenes the notions of justice that prevailed for
almost a century under the federal judiciary's exclusive reign over the
federal insanity defense. In its 1895 decision of Davis v. United States, 195
the Supreme Court cited approvingly a federal test of responsibility,
which supplemented the M'Naghten language, recognizing excusable in-
sanity when the accused's "will, by which I mean the governing power of
his mind, has been, otherwise than voluntarily, so completely destroyed
that his actions are not subject to it but are beyond his control." Thus,
the federal courts acknowledged the validity of a control formulation al-
most a century ago. The Supreme Court has approved, albeit in dicta,
jury instructions providing for excusable insanity as a result of irresistible
impulse. 196 Some jurists assume that, given the opportunity, the
Supreme Court would hold that some type of control test is essential to
the insanity defense.1 97
(3) Abolition of the Control Test Violates the Due Process Right to a Fair Trial
For nearly twenty-five years, the volitional prong of the ALI stan-
dard was the relevant federal control test.198 Administration of the in-
193. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
194. See supra notes 118-41 and accompanying text.
195. 160 U.S. 469, 477 (1895); accord Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897).
196. See Matheson v. United States, 227 U.S. 540, 543 (1913).
197. United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Currens,
290 F.2d 751, 770-71 (3d Cir. 1961).
198. In the same year as the enactment of the Act, in United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d
243, 248 (5th Cir 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930 (1984), over a strong dissent by Judge
Rubin, United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting)
(dissent published separately), the en banc Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dropped the ALI
volitional prong from its substantive test of insanity. The remaining federal circuit courts of
appeal adhered to the ALI formulation in its entirety until expressly directed to do otherwise
by the Act.
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sanity defense has been characteristically liberal, perhaps because of the
extreme infrequency with which the insanity plea is entered in the federal
system. 199 Thus, a tenuous and unfortunate amalgam of symptomatol-
ogy has been held to warrant submission of the defendant's claim of in-
sanity to the jury: shared fantasies of two persons;2°° a combination of
Bell's Palsy, neurosis, and an overdose of valium; 20 chronic abuse of
hallucinogens; 20 2 and an obsessive attachment to military hardware. 20 3
The only mental disorders held to be legally insufficient evidence of in-
sanity to even raise a defense have been those resting solely on voluntary
intoxication or narcotics abuse, 2°4 and, more recently, those based on
pathological gambling disorders. 20 5 The prevailing federal practice was
typified by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Smith: 206
Whenever insanity is asserted as a defense and is supported by any
credible evidence, "it is of critical importance that the defendant's en-
tire relevant symptomatology be brought before the jury" . . . [t]o this
end, the trial judge should permit "an unrestricted inquiry into the
whole personality of a defendant" and should "be free in his admission
of all possibly relevant evidence."
In short, the question of the viability of the insanity defense was
overwhelmingly viewed as a question of fact, rather than a legal issue,
and, as such, a matter to be fully and fairly left to the jury's resolution. 20 7
199. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
200. United States v. McRary, 616 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1011 (1982).
201. United States v. Cooper, 465 F.2d 451, 452 (9th Cir. 1972).
202. Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1974).
203. United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 926 (2d Cir. 1976).
204. Thus, in United States v. Shuckahosee, 609 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (10th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980), omission of the defendant's requested insanity instruction was
upheld when the facts showed that the accused was able to resist the first drink, was not an
alcoholic, suffered from no mental defects or organic brain damage as a result of alcoholism,
was aware of the dangers attending his drinking, and, according to his own experts, exper-
ienced a diminished capacity to resist alcohol only after he had chosen to begin to drink.
Accord, Springer v. Collins, 586 F.2d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 1978) (a defense of insanity based on
alcohol psychosis rejected because of the absence of facts showing that the condition resulted
from "a long-continued habit and not the mental effect of voluntary intoxication which is the
result of a particular drug and/or alcohol binge."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923 (1979).
205. United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 71
(1987); United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036
(1985); United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 52 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Torniero, 735
F.2d 725, 732 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Lewellyn,
723 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1983).
206. 507 F.2d 710, 711 (4th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
207. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Frederick, 578 F.2d 927, 932 (3d Cir.
1978) (citations omitted):
[T]he decision of whether a defendant is affected by a mental disease or defect rests
with the jury's evaluation of all lay and medical evidence in the case . . . . The
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In Duncan v. Louisiana,20 8 the Supreme Court held that the right to trial
by jury was a fundamental component of due process. The Court justified
its decision by recognizing the criminal law's historical "insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence. '209
By legislatively banning juror consideration of the volitional insanity de-
fense, Congress has deprived offenders suffering from defects of control
of their right to trial by jury on a matter that is focal to defining the line
between guilt and innocence.210 Such a deprivation violates the right to a
fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by the fifth amendment's due process
clause.
The truly devastating effect of the Act upon the volitionally im-
paired offender's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial is perhaps
best illustrated by the microcosm of one defendant's case.211 In United
States v. Lakey,212 the defendant was charged with multiple counts of
filing false claims for income tax refunds and making false statements to
a federal agency in connection with those tax returns. Since the filings
occurred in 1982, ex post facto considerations precluded application of
either the new substantive test of insanity or the reallocation of the bur-
den of proving insanity to the defense.213 The evidence showed that the
defendant submitted the same W-2 form to the IRS, using permutations
of her own name and social security number, forty-three times over a two
month period. A defense psychiatrist diagnosed the defendant as suffer-
ing from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which was in an active or acute
phase at the time the offenses were committed. 214
definition of mental disease or defect is essentially a factual, medical question, not a
legal issue. The court should not encroach upon the jury's function of resolving
possibly competing psychiatric views of this definition.
Accord Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1059 (1985); United States v. Gay, 522 F.2d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. McGirr,
434 F.2d 844, 849 (4th Cir. 1970).
208. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
209. Id. at 156.
210. In State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 115-16, 110 P. 1020, 1024 (1910) and State v.
Lange, 168 La. 958, 965, 123 So. 639, 641-42 (1929), the failure to provide for a jury determi-
nation of the insanity defense was held to violate a state constitutional right to trial by jury.
The specific issue has not been litigated federally.
211. While it might be argued that focusing on one individual's experience with mental
disease has little precedential value, Congress did just that by fixating on the Hinckley case.
212. 610 F. Supp. 210, 210-11 (S.D. Tex 1985).
213. Id. at 212 (citing United States v. Kowal, 596 F. Supp. 375 (D. Conn. 1984)); see
United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1986). But see United States v. Roy,
830 F.2d 628, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1987) (the retroactive application of the Act's substantive test of
insanity was deemed to be harmless error since the defendant had not presented any colorable
evidence of insanity under even the older, more liberal standard).
214. Lakey, 610 F. Supp. at 211.
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The defendant opted for a bench trial. The trial court found the
defendant not guilty due to the palpably negative impact her paranoid
schizophrenia had on her ability to conform her conduct to the require-
ments of the law. 215 The court specifically found that the defendant was
not cognitively impaired. Had the filings occurred following the effective
date of the Act,2 16 this defendant would have been branded a felon many
times over and exposed to a maximum sentence of 430 years in prison. 21 7
In all likelihood, she would have been incarcerated for her multiple of-
fenses without being afforded any mental health intervention whatsoever.
Whether returned to the free world on parole or through a sentence of
probation, she would be a probable recidivist since she would not have
received the benefit of psychiatric treatment. Society, having paid
thousands of dollars to incarcerate and parole her, would probably be
forced to make the same pointless expenditures in the future.
Alternatively, the defendant in Lakey could have defended on the
grounds that her volitional impairment negated the mens rea essential for
the crimes charged. 218 If successful, her outright exculpation still would
have subverted the guaranteed intervention of mental health experts in
her behalf. Either way, caught as she would be in an endless cycle occa-
sioned by her mental disease, the defendant's life would be tragically
wasted, guillotined at the narrow horizons defined by her affliction. This
futile and unjust condemnation would occur, despite the sincere and rea-
215. Id. at 213-14.
216. Or in this case, arising from a federal district court in the Fifth Circuit, thirty days
following the date United States v. Lyons was decided (April 16, 1984). See United States v.
Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1984).
217. The defendant was charged in an eighty-six count indictment with forty-three counts
of filing false claims for income tax refunds in violation of 18 U.S.C § 287 (Supp. III 1985) and
forty-three counts of making false statements to a government agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (Supp. III 1985). Lakey, 610 F. Supp. at 210. Since both provisions carry a maximum
term of incarceration of up to five years, the total term of incarceration to which the defendant
was exposed was 430 years.
218. The Act did not, and indeed, constitutionally could not, have stripped the defendant
of his right to present evidence that mental disease compromised his ability to entertain the
mental state necessary for the crime charged. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 890 (3d
Cir. 1987) ("Although Congress intended § 17(a) to prohibit the defenses of diminished re-
sponsibility and diminished capacity, Congress distinguished those defenses from the use of
evidence of mental abnormality to negate specific intent or any other mens rea, which are
elements of the offense."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988); accord United States v. Cox, 826
F.2d 1518, 1524 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 756 (1988); United States v. Gold, 661
F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D.
Cal. 1985); see also Huckabee, Avoiding the Insanity Defense Strait Jacket: The Mens Rea
Route, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1987). But see United States v. White, 766 F.2d 22, 24-25
(1st Cir. 1985) (diminished capacity defense rejected in prosecution for possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute).
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soned conclusion reached by the federal district court judge that the de-
fendant's mental illness left her powerless to conform her conduct to the
requirements of the law. Such a purposeless spectacle contravenes both
the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments and the
fifth amendment's guarantee that the criminally accused will be treated
in a manner that is fundamentally fair.
(4) An Insanity Defense Which Fails to Provide for the Volitionally Insane Is
Constitutionally Under-Inclusive
A substantial body of case law has developed recognizing the exist-
ence of volitionally impaired offenders. In its 1951 decision of Leland v.
Oregon,219 the Supreme Court acknowledged the "tremendous strides"
made by psychiatry since promulgation of the M'Naghten standard, but
stated .that "the progress of science had not reached a point where its
learning would compel us to require the states to eliminate the right and
wrong test from their criminal law." Subsequent psychiatric advances,
however, have clearly established that offenders exist who, due to mental
illness, are unable to control their behavior.220 As explained by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in adopting the ALI formulation,
insanity does not only, or primarily, affect the cognitive or intellectual
faculties, but affects the whole personality of the patient, including
both the will and the emotions. An insane person may therefore often
know the nature and quality of his act and that it is wrong and forbid-
den by law, and yet commit it as a result of the mental disease. 221
Similarly, in adopting the ALI test in 1970, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals observed that "[t]he M'Naghten rules fruitlessly attempt to re-
lieve from punishment only those mentally diseased persons who have no
cognitive capacity .... This formulation ... fails to attack the problem
presented in a case wherein an accused may have understood his actions
but was incapable of controlling his behavior. '222
Given the past quarter-century's documentation of the existence of
volitionally incapacitated offenders, an insanit3, defense that fails to pro-
vide for their exoneration is constitutionally under-inclusive. This con-
clusion is compelled by the historical postulate that criminality entails
blameworthiness. Comments by Professors Bonnie and Slobogin regard-
219. 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1951).
220. See, e.g., infra note 227 and accompanying text.
221. United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir. 1968) (quoting REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 Cmd. No. 8932 at 80).
222. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 66 (9th Cir. 1970). Numerous other cases have
decried the failings of M'Naghten in light of modem psychiatric understanding. See, e.g.,
Smith, 404 F.2d at 723-26; United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 924-26 (4th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 764-67 (3d Cir. 1961).
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ing the need to retain an insanity defense are equally relevant to the re-
tention of the volitional prong:
[T]he ethical foundations of the criminal law are rooted in beliefs
about human rationality, deterrability, and free will. These are articles
of moral faith rather than scientific fact. Many commentators believe
that the integrity of this system of beliefs requires symbolic affirmation
of the pervasively held, but also invalidated, intuition that mental ab-
normalities "exist" and can subvert a person's ability to comprehend
the consequences of his acts or to control his behavior. According to
this view, perpetuation of the insanity defense is essential to the com-
munity's moral perceptions of the legitimacy of punishment. However
uncertain the inquiry, a respect for the moral integrity of the criminal
law may require us to make it.22 3
Perhaps psychiatric ability to identify and calibrate the incapacita-
tion of the volitionally impaired offender is less than perfect, or as the
APA put it, that "[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an im-
pulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and
dusk. ' 224 But where all concede that the line exists, the moral integrity
of the criminal law requires that an individual have the opportunity to
present expert testimony elucidating its contours by way of defense. As
Professor Packer acknowledged in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,
it is not
too important how discriminating we are about drawing some kind of
line to separate those suffering volitional impairment from the rest of
us. The point is that some kind of line must be drawn . . . [for], to
impose the moral condemnation of a criminal conviction on a person
who is thought to have acted in a state of severe volitional impairment
would be to abandon the notion of culpability in its most crucial
use.
22 5
At least one state legislature agrees. Maryland declined to eliminate
an excuse founded on defects of control, citing a report prepared by a
gubernatorial task force that expressly upheld retention of a volitional
test due to the test's relevance to "one of the basic tenets of criminal law,
that punishment for wrongdoing is predicated on culpability. '226 The
task force hinged its decision on a 1983 report, prepared by staff psychia-
trists at Maryland's institution for the criminally insane, that docu-
223. Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process:
The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 448-49 (1980).
224. APA Statement, supra note 18, at 685 (emphasis added). The APA's concern echoes
that of Herman Melville, who observed in Billy Budd: "Who in the rainbow can draw the line
where the violet tint ends and the orange tint begins? Distinctly, we see the differences of the
colors, but where exactly does the first one blendingly enter into the other? So with sanity and
insanity." quoted in Robitscher and Haynes, supra note 180, at 27.
225. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 133 (1968).
226. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108 task force comment at 154 (Supp. 1987).
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mented the deleterious impact of abolishing all provision for exculpation
based on defects of control.
The state's psychiatric experts indicated that such a "reform" would
"systematically eliminate a class of psychotic patient whose illness is
clearest in symptomatology, most likely biologic in origin, most emi-
nently treatable, and potentially most disruptive in penal detention. '227
The study also predicted that abolition of a control test would actually
generate more contested insanity pleas than it would prevent because it
would engender split opinions from the state's forensic experts, presuma-
bly as a result of frustrations over the unnatural limitations of a purely
cognitive formulation.228
Thus, Maryland's state psychiatrists perceive the volitionally im-
paired wrongdoer as part of a quite cognizable class of offender who de-
serves exculpation. Further, these experts believe that the volitionally
impaired can be successfully rehabilitated only by the intervention of
mental health experts and that incarceration will serve neither the of-
fender nor society. 229 To label such an offender a criminal would be a
cruel mistake.
(5) The Difficulties Inherent in Identifying True Volitional Insanity Cannot
Justify Abolishing the Control Test
While the inquiry into a defendant's capacity for control may not be
free from ambiguity, neither are questions regarding mens rea, necessity,
and cognitive impairment. All of these issues have historically been
viewed as the proper province of the jury, as have duress and the ade-
quacy of provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. The latter de-
fenses respectively provide for total or partial exculpation for persons
who suffer from control impairment, and thus the insanity defense can
hardly be viewed as unique.
The continued existence of the duress defense is a strong paradigm
for perpetuating an insanity defense based on defects of control. Juror
evaluation of a plea of duress, like a claim of volitional incapacitation,
"involves a 'moral' assessment and... acknowledges that free will may
be overcome in certain instances. ' 230 The duress defense-was expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bailey.2 31 The gov-
ernment's brief in that case conceded that, like the volitional insanity
227. Id
228. Id
229. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
230. P. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 41 (1988 Supp.).
231. 444 U.S. 394, 415 (1980).
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defense, the duress defense is "anciently woven into the fabric of our
culture" 232 and that "punishment is inappropriate for crimes committed
under duress because the defendant in such circumstances cannot fairly
be blamed for his wrongful act."' 233 The duress defense is predicated
upon a belief that even reasonable people may understandably and
blamelessly fail to resist external coercive pressures to violate the law. 234
Control tests simply posit that the exculpating coercive forces can origi-
nate from intra-psychic compulsion originating from "the duress of the
disease." 235
In order to evaluate pleas of duress or the reasonableness of a violent
response to various provocations, a jury must reckon with elusive, imper-
fect, and philosophical demarcations regarding the proper bounds of hu-
manity's capacity for self control. These may well be difficult questions,
but they are questions that the very postulate of punishment requires the
jury to address and resolve. Drawing the line between the irresistible
impulse and the impulse not resisted involves questions of like dimen-
sion. In Professor Wexler's view, the task presents "a philosophical co-
nundrum. ' 236 Yet, as Wexler poignantly summarizes this pole of the
dialectic, "not until Hinckley did that conundrum 'prevent jurisdiction
after jurisdiction from regarding a solely cognitive test as primitive and
morally under inclusive.' ",237
The fifth amendment case for exculpation based on defects of con-
trol can also be bolstered by analogy to the Supreme Court's provision in
United States v. Park for a defense of being "powerless to prevent" viola-
tions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.23.8 Park was the chief
232. Brief for the United States at 21, United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (No.78-
990) (quoting J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d ed. 1960)).
233. Id. at 23.
234. P. ROBINSON, supra note 230, at 301-02 (1984).
235. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 596, 2 So. 854, 866 (1886).
236. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 538 (1985)
(citing Wexler, An Offense - Victim Approach to Insanity Defense Reform, 26 ARIz. L. REV.
17, 20 n.32 (1984)). Professor Wexler is Chair of the ABA Commission on the Mentally
Disabled and the National Center for State Court's Institute on Mental Disability & the Law,
Vice President of the International Academy of Law & Mental Health, and a member of the
Editorial Advisory Board of the International Journal of Law and Psychiatry.
237. Id. at 538-39.
238. 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975). The Court observed that
[t]he theory upon which responsible corporate agents are held criminally accountable
for 'causing' violations ... permits a claim that a defendant was 'powerless' to pre-
vent or correct the violation to 'be raised defensively at a trial on the merits.' United
States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964). If such a claim is made,
the defendant has the burden of coming forward with evidence, but this does not
alter the Government's ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
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executive officer of a national corporation with 36,000 employees and
over 800 retail stores. The government prosecuted him for rat infestation
of food stored in one of the company's sixteen warehouses. 239 Although
the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the mens rea required to convict
under the statute in issue, the Court's opinion specifically provided that
mens rea was relevant. 24° The government bore the burden of proving
that the defendant was not powerless to prevent the adulteration.241
Thus, even in the context of laws designed to protect zealously the pub-
lic's interest in the purity of its food,242 criminal conviction is inappropri-
ate when doubt exists about the defendant's power to control the
operations which run afoul of the statute, despite his responsible relation-
ship to the problem as chief corporate officer. Read more broadly, Park
stands for the proposition that an accused cannot be labelled a criminal
unless his culpability is clear.
The Supreme Court's overriding concern for accuracy in the articu-
lation of the line between guilt and innocence was expressed more re-
cently in Ake v. Oklahoma. 243 In Ake, the accused indigent pleaded not
guilt by reason of insanity. The defendant was foreclosed from present-
ing an insanity defense, however, because the trial court refused to grant
funds necessary to retain an expert. In reversing the trial court's ruling
on due process grounds, the Supreme Court described the accused's in-
terest in the accuracy of the criminal proceeding as "almost uniquely
compelling," 24 and termed the role of psychiatry in criminal trials as
"pivotal."24 5 The majority declined the opportunity to join the observa-
tion of the lone dissenter, then Justice Rehnquist, who opined that "[i]t is
highly doubtful that due process requires a State to make available an
insanity defense to a criminal defendant. '246
The gravamen of Ake's due process right to psychiatric assistance is
recognition of the injustice inherent in risking the wrongful conviction of
a defendant who is insane. Ake squarely defines as paramount the de-
fendant's interest in the reliable determination of guilt or innocence and
notes that "the host of safeguards fashioned by... [the] Court over the
the defendant's guilt, including his power ... to prevent or correct the prohibited
condition.
239. I at 660.
240. Id. at 673, 676.
241. I at 673.
242. Id. at 671.
243. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
244. Id. at 78.
245. Id. at 79.
246. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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years to diminish the risk of erroneous conviction stands as a testament
to that concern. 247 Even the prosecution's interest in securing a convic-
tion "is necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adju-
dication of criminal cases." '24 8
Since volitionally impaired offenders clearly exist, foreclosing such
offenders from raising a volitional insanity defense, "cast[s] a pall on the
accuracy of the verdict[s] obtained" 249 in contravention of these offend-
ers' compelling right to an accurate determination of culpability. Imper-
fection in articulating the line between guilt and innocence is antithetical
to the American system of justice and the balancing of interests embod-
ied in the presumption of innocence.
Indeed, sentencing is the only context in which criminal law has
shown a willingness to tolerate procedural imperfection in the adjudica-
tive process. There, even with regard to convicted capital defendants, it
has been acknowledged that "there can be no perfect procedure for de-
ciding in which cases government authority should be used to impose
death. ' 250 Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with such a
perspective, sentencing procedures obviously are only applied to individ-
uals whose guilt has been reliably proven. It is the very determination of
guilt, however, that is called into question when the volitionally impaired
offender is barred from presenting an adequate defense theory.
To hold that such an individual is wholly foreclosed from raising his
mental condition as a defense in a criminal case denies the individual a
full consideration of issues that are fundamental to the proper demarca-
tion of the line between guilt and innocence. When this threshold ques-
tion of guilt and innocence is involved, the wholesale abdication of an
acknowledged ground for a defense is contrary to longstanding "canons
of decency and fairness. '25 1 The fifth amendment's due process clause
does not tolerate such a glaring imperfection at the guilt-innocence phase
of a criminal trial.
247. Id. at 78.
248. Id. at 79.
249. Id.
250. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
605 (1977) (plurality opinion)); accord Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984) ("Any capital
sentencing scheme may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes.").
251. Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The
question asked by substantive due process is whether the practice would "offend those canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of English-speaking people even towards
those charged with the most heinous offense." Id.
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IV. The Policy Perspective
If not unconstitutional, Congress' complete omission of a volitional
insanity defense is bad policy. The abolition of this defense constitutes a
radical departure from widely held federal and state understandings of
the scope of a proper insanity defense. Prior to Hinckley, all of the fed-
eral courts that had considered the matter favored inclusion of a voli-
tional test.252 The great majority of states that had revised their penal
codes since promulgation of the Model Penal Code chose the ALI test
with its provision for volitional exculpation. 25 3 When one adds the states
that legislatively adopted the ALI formulation (absent recent full scale
revisions of their penal codes),254 the states that accepted the ALI formu-
lation by judicial decision,255 and the states that retained hlternate voli-
tional tests,256 the number of jurisdictions with a volitional test prior to
the Hinckley case included well over half the states, eleven of the twelve
federal circuits, Puerto Rico, and the military courts.
The NMHA convened a National Commission on the Insanity De-
fense that explicitly considered the ABA's proposal to eliminate the con-
trol test. The Commission rejected the proposal in favor of a formulation
including both cognitive and volitional elements, comporting with "the
modem view of the mind as a unified entity whose functioning may be
252. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
253. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, at 175 n.31. The jurisdictions with revised codes
whose provisions are modeled on the ALI test are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Texas, Utah,
and Wisconsin.
254. Id. at 175-77 n.32. These states include Alaska, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Ver-
mont, and Wyoming.
255. Id at 176, n.33; see People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 339, 583 P.2d 1318, 1320, 149
Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1978) (renounced in 1982 by voter approval of a return to M'Naghten,
codified at CAL. PENAL CODE, § 25(b) (Deering Supp. 1985)); Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 612,
251 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1969); Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 555, 226 N.E.2d 556,
563 (1967); State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254, 267, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (1979); Graham v. State,
547 S.W.2d 531, 543 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Grimm, 156 W. Va. 615, 632, 195 S.E.2d 637, 647
(1973). The ALI test was adopted for the District of Columbia local law in Bethea v. United
States, 365 A.2d 64, 79 (D.C. App. 1976), cert denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977), and for the mili-
tary jurisdiction in United States v. Frederick, 3 M.J. 230, 237 (C.M.A. 1977).
256. These states include Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 26-703 [16-3-3] excuses one who
suffered from "a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist
committing the crime"); New Mexico (see State v. White, 270 P.2d 727, 730 (1954) ("if by
reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will
which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found
guilty.")); Virginia (Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 718, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952)
(An irresistible impulse determination requires a finding that "the accused is able to under-
stand the nature and consequences of his act and knows it to be wrong, [and that] his mind has
become so impaired by disease that he is totally deprived of the mental power to control or
restrain the act.")).
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impaired in numerous ways. "257 In the aftermath of the Hinckley acquit-
tal, however, what was once viewed as proper policy-making has drasti-
cally changed.
By abolishing the volitional prong and recasting the cognitive prong
in language requiring absolute rather than substantial incapacitation, and
by mandating that the potential class of exculpating mental diseases be
restricted to those denominated as "severe, '258 the Act has turned back
the jurisprudential clocks to the unenlightened days of M'Naghten. As
was stated by Professor Wexler when the Act was under consideration,
"[i]t is tiring--even embarrassing-to be arguing in 1984 whether we
should return to the M'Naghten rule of 1843-or to the rule of an even
earlier era."'2 59 M'Naghten has been decried even in England, where its
"obsolete" and "rigid" terminology has resulted in de facto abolition of
the insanity defense. 260
M'Naghten terminology is based on an antiquated perception of
human psychology that defines reason as the sole determinant of human
behavior. This view ignores contemporary psychiatric understandings of
man as an integrated personality and is, consequently, an inadequate
yardstick by which to assess responsibility. 26 1 Modern forensic psychia-
try abjures the obsolete notion that "there is a separate little man at the
top of one's head called reason whose function it is to guide another un-
ruly little man called instinct, emotion or impulse in the way he should
257. See NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, supra note 34, at 36.
258. Although the Act does not define the term "severe," the legislative history indicates
that the term was added to insure that relatively minor mental disorders such as nonpsychotic
behavior disorders or personality disorders would not provide the basis for an insanity defense.
See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, 229, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3411. In its HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL
ACT OF 1984, at 59 (1984), the United States Department of Justice states that the addition of
the term "severe" to the insanity standard was designed to abolish reliance on the broad-
sweeping definition of mental disease or defect contained in the widely followed decision in
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substan-
tially impairs behavior controls.").
259. Wexler, An Offense-Victim Approach to Insanity Defense Reform, 26 ARIz. L. REV.
17, 25 (1984).
260. D. CHISWICK, M. MCISAAC, F. MCCLINTOCK, PROSECUTION OF THE MENTALLY
DISTURBED 13 (1984). The insanity defense has been raised in England in "only one or two
cases a year in the last decade." Id.
261. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966) ("The gravamen of the
objections to the MNaghten Rules is that they are not in harmony with modem medical sci-
ence which . . . is opposed to any concept which divides the mind into separate compart-
ments-the intellect, the emotions and the will. The Model Penal Code formulation views the
mind as a unified entity and recognizes that mental disease or defect may impair its functioning
in numerous ways.").
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go."' 2 6 2 In short, the M'Naghten test is both bad psychiatry and bad law.
The arguments in favor of a return to M'Naghten and, concomi-
tantly, an abolition of a federal control test are few. In United States v.
Lyons, 263 the arguments are distilled to their critical essence. The criti-
cisms are directed at a professed inability of psychiatry to scientifically
calibrate human incapacity for control264 and a concern that jurors, cast
"adrift upon a sea of unfounded scientific speculation, '265 will end up
making the "moral mistake" 266 of wrongfully acquitting. The allegations
regarding inadequacies in current psychiatric discernment are only skele-
tally supported. 267 The same conclusory record undergirded the con-
gressional debate, which relied upon APA and ABA position papers to
support an abolitionist posture toward volitional insanity.268 None of
these sources presented any empirical analysis to justify their conclu-
sions. Moreover, no contrary positions were either referred to or sum-
marized. As renowned forensic psychologist Richard Rogers stated,
"[b]oth attorneys and psychiatrists attempted to disavow the Hinckley
case, seeking their own exculpation through proposals for a more restric-
tive standard. '269
Rogers' work on the development of empirical scales to objectively
measure both cognitive and volitional impairment has been widely
respected. 270 Contemporaneously with the congressional debate, Rogers
perfected clinical tests to calibrate both defects of reason and defects of
control. These tests exhibited near perfect interexaminer reliability
(ninety-seven percent), a high concordance rate with subsequent legal
disposition (eighty-eight percent), and theoretically consistent and statis-
262. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (quoting Holloway v.
United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1948)).
263. 731 F.2d 243, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1984).
264. Id at 248.
265. Id at 249.
266. Id (citation omitted).
267. Id at 248 n.10.
268. The ABA has asserted that "[b]ehavioral science has not yielded clinical tools for
calibrating impairments of behavior controls." MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 19,
§ 7-6.1, at 265 (Washington, D.C. 1983). The APA statement qualified this position, stating
that "[m]any psychiatrists ... believe that psychiatric information relevant to determining
whether a defendant understood the nature of his act, and whether he -appreciated its wrong-
fulness, is more reliable and has a stronger scientific basis than, for example, does psychiatric
information relevant to whether a defendant was able to control his behavior." APA STATE-
MENT, supra note 18, at 685.
269. Rogers, Assessment of Criminal Responsibility. Empirical Advances and Unanswered
Questions, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 73, 76 (1987) (emphasis in the original).
270. Id Rogers' article regarding these responsibility assessment scales memorializes a
lecture he presented as first recipient of the Distinguished Contributions to Forensic Psychol-
ogy Award by the American Academy of Forensic Psychologists in 1985.
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tically significant differences between sane and insane subjects. 271
Neither this research, nor any like it, ever informed the congressional
debate.
Concededly, even if statistical reality rather than rhetoric character-
ized the legislative colloquy, there was not a perfect clinical measure for
assessment of either cognitive or volitional impairment, nor will there
ever be one.2 72 Yet, as was acknowledged in response to like concern
over problems of proving volitional defects in Parsons v. State, "[i]t is no
satisfactory objection to say that the rule above announced by us is of
difficult application. The rule in McNaghten's Case is equally obnoxious
to a like criticism. The difficulty does not lie in the rule, but is inherent
in the subject of insanity itself. ' '273
These matters are simply not amenable to absolute psychiatric certi-
tude. Even if they were, the resolution of the dividing line between re-
sponsibility and non-responsibility is the purview of the jury, not the
medical expert.2 74 Recognition of the importance of community, rather
than expert, assessments of responsibility has informed court decisions
which regard moral issues as embedded in the definition of "mental dis-
ease. ' '275 This view and limitations in discerning psychiatric causation276
led the District of Columbia to reject an insanity test 2 77 that apparently
afforded undue deference to expert opinion.2 78 Congressional concerns
over the dangers of psychiatric experts usurping the proper functioning
271. Id. at 75 (citing Rogers & Cavanaugh, Rogers Criminal Responsibility Assessment
Scales, 160 ILL. MED. J. 164 ch. 3 (1981) ("interexaminer reliability" means that different
experts' evaluations of the same individual resulted in identical diagnostic conclusions; "con-
cordance rate" refers to the degree of correlation between the experts' ultimate opinions re-
garding responsibility and the verdicts rendered)); R. ROGERS, ROGERS CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY ASSESSMENT SCALES (R-CRAS) AND TEST MANUAL (1984); Rogers,
Dolmetsch, & Cavanaugh, An Empirical Approach to Insanity Evaluations, 37 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 683 (1981); Rogers, Seman & Wasyliw, The RCRAS and Legal Insanity: A
Cross-Validation Study, 39 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 554 (1983); Rogers, Wasyliw, & Cava-
naugh, Evaluating Insanity: A Study of Construct Validity, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293
(1984).
272. Rogers, supra note 267, at 77. As Rogers states, "[o]bviously, no standard has ever
been constructed that prevents all 'morally repugnant' defendants from being found insane.
No standard will be devised that will clearly demarcate those grossly disturbed individuals
who engender empathy from those who affront our morality." Id.
273. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala 577, 593-94, 2 So. 854, 864-65 (1886) (citation omitted).
274. P. ROBINSON, supra note 230, at 41; see also Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal
Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 395-96 (1976).
275. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
276. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
277. The Durham rule was promulgated in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-
75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (en banc) (footnote omitted), and provided that a defendant was not re-
sponsible "if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." Id.
278. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
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of the jury as the arbiter of the moral judgment of the community also
resulted in passage of an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 704.
That rule now forecloses experts from presenting any opinion testimony
whatsoever on the ultimate issue of nonresponsibility.279
The second concern which dominated the congressional debate, and
the Lyons majority opinion, centered on a fear that moral mistakes would
result from juror speculation regarding the defendant's capacity for self-
control.280 Such a concern is sorely misplaced. The existence of persons
who cannot conform their conduct to the requirements of the law is fully
conceded.281 Neither Congress nor the Lyons court, however, provide
279. Prior to the passage of the Act, former Rule 704 provided: "[T]estimony in the form
of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
Rule 704 was amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. IV,
§ 406 (1984). As amended, Rule 704 provides in pertinent part:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone.
FED. R. EvID. 704.
The legislative history quotes at length from a report prepared by the American Psychiat-
ric Association to justify the amendment:
[I]t is clear that psychiatrists are experts in medicine, not the law. As such, it is
clear that the psychiatrist's first obligation and expertise in the courtroom is to "do
psychiatry," i.e., to present medical information and opinion about the defendant's
mental state and motivation and to explain in detail the reason for his medical-psy-
chiatric conclusions. When, however, "ultimate issue" questions are formulated by
the law and put to the expert witness... [he] is required to make a leap in logic. He
no longer addresses himself to medical concepts but instead must infer or intuit what
is in fact unspeakable, namely, the probable relationship between medical concepts
and legal or moral constructs such as free will ....
Psychiatrists, of course, must be permitted to testify fully about the defendant's
diagnosis,. mental state and motivation (in clinical and commonsense terms) at the
time of the alleged act so as to permit the jury or judge to reach the ultimate conclu-
sion about which they and only they are expert. Determining whether a criminal
defendant was legally insane is a matter for legal fact-finders, not for experts.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, 225, 230-31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3407, 3412-13 (footnotes omitted). For a critique of the amendment of
Rule 704, see Comment, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 620 (1987) (authored by Anne Lawson
Braswell).
280. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Bonnie, supra note
164, at 196 ("[T]he risks of fabrication and 'moral mistakes'.. . are greatest when... the jury
[is] ... asked to speculate whether the defendants had the capacity to 'control,' "); S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, 227, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3409.
281. Lyons, 731 F.2d at 249 ("[m]ost psychotic persons who fail a volitional test would
also fail a cognitive test, thus rendering the volitional test superfluous for them." (emphasis
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for the exculpation of such mentally infirm individuals. By eliminating
the volitional prong altogether, Congress implied that the law "would
achieve morally correct results more often. The objective of the law,
however, should not be to achieve morally correct results more often, but
rather to avoid morally incorrect results at all times. ' 282 As Judge
Rubin wrote in his dissent in Lyons, it is indeed "a peculiar notion of
morality" that embraces abolition of a rule that "virtually ensures unde-
served, and therefore unjust, punishment in the name of avoiding moral
mistakes." 283
The abolitionist perspective on volitional insanity has been sup-
ported by "declamation, not data. '284 As the Lyons dissenters noted,
"[i]t is based only on intuitive reactions and the published recommenda-
tions, to which no one has testified, of a few professional groups. We
would permit no jury to decide even an unimportant issue on such hear-
say."'285 Perhaps volitional impairment occurs with less frequency than
cognitive impairment,286 and thus, the impact of excising the control test
may be de minimis, except upon "those few unfortunate persons so af-
flicted by mental disease that they knew what the law forbade but
couldn't control their actions sufficiently to avoid violating it. ' ' 287 The
empirical record is virtually nonexistent.28 8 Nevertheless, Congress
added)). The necessary but unstated implication is that the volitional test is not superfluous
for all because there exists a class of mentally ill offenders who exhibit defects of control, but
not of reason.
282. Comment, United States v. Lyons: Abolishing the Volitional Prong of the Insanity
Defense, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177, 185 (1984) (authored by Judith A. Morse and Greg-
ory K. Thorenson).
283. Lyons, 739 F.2d at 999 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 997.
285. Id. at 1000.
286. Rogers, supra note 269, at 78-79 observes: "The only available study in which clini-
cians were blind to the research hypothesis found that nearly all the defendants clinically eval-
uated as insane were cognitively impaired. In the study of 125 defendants, there was 97%
agreement between the cognitive-only proposal and the ALI standard."
287. Lyons, 739 F.2d at 1000 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
288. The author made a Freedom of Information Act request on the Executive Office of
the United States Attorney seeking to quantify the federal courts' experience with the voli-
tional insanity defense. The Executive Office indicated that no records were kept regarding the
number of insanity pleas entered, let alone what percentage of each of the pleas in the latter
categories were successful. The author's own experience as an Assistant Federal Defender for
the District of Maryland from 1981-1984 included entering six insanity pleas, two of which
were based on nonpsychotic volitional impairment-a significant percentage of this limited
sample. A study of Maryland's switch from M'Naghten to ALI found that the number of
offenders evaluated as not responsible rose from 22 out of 278 in 1966 (or 8% of the total
examined) to 73 out of 380 in 1973 (or 19% of those evaluated) B. SALES & T. HAFEMEISTER,
EMPIRICISM AND LEGAL POLICY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, reprinted in MENTAL HEALTH
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 253, 269, 275 n.9 (L. Teplin ed. 1984). It is not clear, however,
[Vol. 40
should have considered less restrictive measures rather than completely
abdicate its obligation to fairly administer the criminal justice system on
behalf of this population of offenders, regardless of the size of the popula-
tion effected.
In United States v. Torniero,289 for example, the Second Circuit de-
clined invitations to abolish the insanity defense generally and the voli-
tional prong specifically, but did adopt a narrowing of the ALI volitional
standard. Under Torniero, a defendant had to establish that his mental
infirmity was widely understood by respected authorities in the field as
being a mental disease or defect that impairs behavioral controls, and
that there was a relevant connection between this condition and the de-
fendant's incapacity to control his conduct. 290 Judge Rubin describes the
Second Circuit's conditional control defense as evidence "that the voli-
tional test can be reasonably cabined to prevent abuse. '291 Professor
Bonnie also acknowledges a middle ground: "The volitional inquiry
probably would be manageable if the insanity defense were permitted
only in cases involving psychotic disorders. ' 292 Since Congress adopted
such a compromise position by limiting the availability of the insanity
defense to those suffering from "severe" mental diseases or defects,293
abolition of the volitional prong was unnecessary from a policy
perspective.
Similarly, Professor Morse has suggested that retention of a voli-
tional test could be upheld if it were narrowly proscribed so as to "excuse
only those who were utterly overwhelmed by their impulses." 294 Again,
while the Act overrides the ALI's provision for exculpation based on
"substantial" incapacitation by requiring total impairment, 295 it is read-
whether this tripling of the findings of nonresponsibility resulted from ALI's expanded concept
of knowledge or its inclusion of a control test. Thus, such anecdotal evidence sheds little light
on the true operational significance of the abolition of the volitionally-based plea. Absent evi-
dence, it would be a grave error to conclude that abolition of the volitional test will have a
marginal effect on the federal courts' proper administration of the insanity defense.
289. 735 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985).
290. Id. at 731-32.
291. 739 F.2d at 998 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
292. Bonnie, supra note 164, at 196. This article, of course, rejects Bonnie's compromise
offer as morally unacceptable in light of the author's personal experience representing two
federal criminal defendants with strong cases for volitional nonresponsibility, neither of whom
showed any evidence of psychotic thought processes. See supra note 288.
293. See supra note 258.
294. Insanity Defense in Federal Courts: Hearings on H.R. 6783 and Related Bills Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess.
233 (1982) (statement of Stephen J. Morse).
295. The Act exonerates only the offender who "was unable to appreciate the nature and
quality or the wrongfulness of his acts." 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). The
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ily apparent that avenues existed by which perceived abuses could be
minimized, while still perpetuating a federal insanity test based on de-
fects of control.
An intermediate position was also proposed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in the 1846 decision of Commonwealth v Mosler.296 In
Mosler, a control test was upheld subject to express conditions that the
offender's alleged volitional impairment must clearly exist and have evi-
denced itself on more than the occasion for which the volitional insanity
plea was interposed. 297
Conclusion
Congress' decision to jettison all provision for volitional exculpation
from the federal insanity formulation is contrary to historical precedent,
constitutionally infirm, and impeachable from a policy perspective. The
Act denies mentally impaired offenders the right to be held blameless for
conduct that is beyond their power to control and leaves them defense-
less against criminal accusations. A law with such grim consequences for
the truly mentally impaired offender should not be sustained.
The issue is of moment to more than the John Hinckleys of the
world. As long as the criminal law retains its foundational belief in the
individual's ability and obligation to control his own destiny, efforts to
eliminate the primary mechanism for evaluating the capacity for self-
control must be zealously resisted. To erase the exculpatory impact of
defects of control is to erode from the face of criminal law the fundamen-
tal importance of blameworthiness to our system of crime and punish-
ment, which in turn, detracts from our ability to justly condemn. If the
moral integrity of the criminal law is to retain its vitality, the case for
exculpation based on volitional impairment must not only be acknowl-
edged, but honored, by allowing a control formulation to resume its
rightful place in the federal criminal justice system's substantive test of
the insanity defense.
ALI formulation allows the offender who merely "lacks substantial capacity" to appreciate
wrongfulness to maintain an insanity defense (emphasis added). See supra note 6.
296. 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
297. Id. at 267.
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